Scipio the African vanquisher of Hannibal. Publius Cornelius Scipio African Senior: biography, photo. How Scipio defeated Hannibal
In the spring of 204 BC. e. Publius Cornelius Scipio landed with troops in Africa, striking at the very heart of Carthage. Despite his consular powers, he commanded a small army - he had only two legions under his command and 7,000 volunteers recruited in Italy. For two years, he expanded the bridgehead for further offensive. He managed to gain a foothold in Africa and lure the Numidians to his side - excellent riders and shooters. Using tactics adopted from Hannibal, Scipio defeated the Carthaginian commander Gisgon and seized the initiative. After that, Scipio occupied Tunisia and took control of the food supply routes to. The position of the Carthaginians became more and more difficult.
Map of the African campaign of Scipio 204-202. (pinterest.com)
Return of Barca
The successes of the Romans in Africa required decisive measures - Hannibal Barca was called from Italy to protect the capital. By this time, he was an experienced military leader, and there were legends about his military leadership. He was 45 years old, he knew how to convince people and lead the soldiers behind him. At a critical moment for the state, he returned to Africa to destroy the Roman army and punish the traitorous Numidians. Together with Hannibal, his veterans arrived in Africa, who had already fought with him in Italy for 15 years. They were experienced warriors, personally devoted to Hannibal.
Hannibal Barca. (pinterest.com)
Hannibal landed south of Carthage and immediately began active operations. He had to replenish the army (especially the commander counted on the Numidian mercenaries), free Carthage from the food blockade and throw the Romans into the sea. Soon, troops from Italy arrived in time for him, which consisted of Celts, Iberians and Moors. The forces of the Carthaginians grew to 35 thousand people, and in addition to the infantry and cavalry, the army included war elephants. From the large city of Hadrumet, Hannibal moved to the northeast and camped near the city of Zama, 150 km west of Carthage.
On the eve of the battle
Soon the Romans approached Zama, whose army was also reinforced by the Numidians. According to ancient authors, Hannibal and Scipio met before the battle. The Punian tried to reconcile with Publius, reminding him how changeable fate can be (after all, quite recently the Carthaginian army stood under the walls of Rome), and offered peace. But Scipio, enraged by the treacherous violation of the peace by the Carthaginian senate, did not accept the conditions of Hannibal. This is how he ended his speech: “It remains for you to either give yourself and your Fatherland to our discretion, or defeat us on the battlefield.” There was no way out for Hannibal.
Source: pinterest.com
The battle was to decide not only the outcome of the war, but also who would get the role of hegemon in the world. Carthage defended its independence, the Romans fought for peace. Here is what the Greek historian Polybius wrote about the upcoming battle: “Never before have there been troops so experienced in battle, so happy and skillful in military affairs commanders; Never before had fate promised such valuable rewards to the fighters. The winner was to gain power not only over Libya and Europe, but also over all other countries of the world hitherto known to us.
balance of power
Scipio lined up his troops as follows: in the center in two lines he built infantry (in the first line of hastati - young soldiers, in the second line of principles and triarii - veterans), cavalry was located on the flanks. Under Zama, the Romans used a dismembered battle formation, which made it possible to combine shooters and heavy infantrymen in the ranks and make quick changes.
Roman soldiers during the Second Punic War. (pinterest.com)
Hannibal under Zama had 80 elephants - more than ever before (however, the elephants were poorly trained). He decided to build up elephants in front of his front in order to frighten the Romans and smash his way through their line like a battering ram. The infantry was lined up in three lines: in the first, the Celts and the Iberians, who arrived in time for him from Italy. In the second line are Carthaginian mercenaries recruited in Africa and a detachment of Macedonians. Hannibal's veterans lined up in the third (reserve) line. On the flanks were the Numidian and Carthaginian cavalry.
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The ratio and size of the armies that fought at Zama is still a matter of controversy, but probably the forces of the parties were approximately equal (about 35 thousand people on each side), but the Romans had superiority in cavalry, and the Punians, respectively, in infantry.
elephant attack
The battle began with the attack of the Roman front. Dozens of elephants moved on the army of Scipio, but he managed to prepare in advance. There was a roar of trumpets, throwers showered the elephants with arrows and darts, which plunged the animals into a panic. The animals turned back and began to trample on their own troops - Hannibal's cavalry especially got it. Those elephants that moved forward passed through the Roman maniples, built at intervals along the front, without harming them.
Immediately after the flight of the elephants, Scipio attacked Hannibal's horsemen with cavalry and defeated them. The Roman cavalry rushed to pursue the fugitives and dropped out of the battle, but the flanks of the Carthaginians were exposed.
Battle of Zama, attack by elephants. (pinterest.com)
infantry combat
The infantry (except for the veterans of Hannibal) moved towards each other. The Punians advanced in two echelons, the Romans in a single formation. Despite the swiftness of the attack of the Celts and Ligurians of the first line of Hannibal, the Roman front was not broken, and soon the legionnaires themselves pressed the Gauls, advancing in deep formation. The second line of Hannibal's army did not take part in this attack. The Italian detachments of the Carthaginians were scattered, but the attempt to attack the second line of the Punians ended in failure - the maniples of the hastati choked in blood. Second line prin- ciples came to the aid of their comrades and led the next attack. At their expense, Scipio extended the front and swept the enemy from the flanks. Despite fierce resistance, the Carthaginian phalanx was cut, and now the second line has ceased to exist. Further on the path of the Romans were fresh forces that did not take part in the battle and consisted of veterans of Hannibal.
Instead of immediately rushing to attack the third line of the Punians, Scipio showed composure and reorganized his troops. He gathered all the infantry in one line, leaving the hastati in the center and building the triarii on the flanks for a simultaneous strike with all forces. This repeated the construction of Hannibal at Cannae. Roman troops showed iron discipline. But despite all the preparations, the Romans were unable to break through the system of the Carthaginians. Neither side could prevail.
The outcome of the battle was decided by the Roman cavalry, which returned to the battlefield and hit Hannibal in the rear. After a stubborn battle, the Carthaginians faltered. A massacre began, Hannibal's army ceased to exist, he himself barely escaped. The Romans lost probably about 5,000 men.
Soldiers of Hannibal's army. (pinterest.com)
Battle results
This is how Polybius describes the battlefield: "Everything was covered with blood, filled with the wounded and killed, ... heaps of corpses, bleeding and piled on top of each other, as well as weapons scattered everywhere in disorder along with people." It was all over for Carthage. The greatest general of the Hellenistic world was subsequently slain by the Roman consul. "The worthy met the most worthy" as the proverb says. This marked the beginning of a new era - power over the Mediterranean passed to Rome.
The Battle of Zama is a rare example of a clash between two true geniuses of war. A subtle understanding of tactics and strategy by Scipio and excellent knowledge of the enemy helped Rome not only survive, but also defeat the formidable Carthage. It is ironic that the same two legions that once fled the battlefield at Cannae were the basis of Scipio's army at Zama. Peace was soon made. The Second Punic War ended with the victory of Rome, and in just 55 years Carthage will be completely destroyed by the Romans. For Scipio, the battle of Zama was the zenith of his career. Interestingly, both great commanders ended their lives in exile and obscurity, thus, their fates were connected to the very end.
When Scipio crossed from Sicily to Africa, Hannibal had not yet been defeated and was with a small army in Lower Italy. One might ask why Scipio did not first attack Hannibal here, where he could easily gain a large advantage over the enemy and put an end to the war? The answer to the question will be this: in this case, Hannibal would have managed to avoid a decisive battle with the superior forces of the enemy and in the end would have withdrawn his army to Africa. And if he arrived there before Scipio, then it would be very difficult for the latter to gain a foothold in Africa and enter into an alliance with the Numidians.
It would perhaps be more correct to pose the reverse question: why did not Hannibal earlier voluntarily clear Italy, where he could no longer hope for any positive achievements? The answer will be this: Hannibal did not seek victory over Rome, but only to conquer the world on acceptable terms, and believed that the Romans would pay a decent price for the cleansing of Italy. Even when
Scipio landed in Africa, Hannibal did not immediately follow him. He knew that the Romans would not be able to achieve particularly great successes and, in any case, they would not strike at the city of Carthage itself, the fortifications of which had a three times larger perimeter than the then Rome (26,905 m), and if his fellow countrymen manage to cope with Scipio without him, while the Romans for their part fail to drive the Punians out of Italy, the forces will be to some extent in balance, and on this basis peace can be made.
Only when Scipio had already been in Africa for two years and, thanks to his enterprise and luck, achieved unexpectedly great successes, namely, he captured Syphax and found a strong ally in Masinissa, Hannibal finally left Italy and with the remnants of his army came to Africa for the last fight. . His arrival gave the Carthaginians the courage to reject the already concluded peace and even break the truce, so that everything now depended on which side the preponderance of military forces would be on. In addition to the veterans of Hannibal, the detachments of his brother Magon, Balearic, Ligurian and Celtic, also arrived in Africa; began to recruit among the African tribes, and even the Carthaginian citizens themselves took up arms.
It was not only possible to win over to their side most of the Numidian tribes - and just those whose camps lay closer to Carthage: Masinissa called them to arms to help the Romans.
Both sides were busy preparing for the fight. With wise calculation, Hannibal established his headquarters not in Carthage itself, but in a small seaside town, Hadrumet, 5-6 marches south of Carthage. Here he better guarded his veterans from the corrupting contact with the capital; here he could more firmly hold in his hands the new detachments that were being formed; from here he could attack Scipio from the rear if he moved to Carthage itself, and he himself was covered by Carthage from the flank if the Romans wanted to attack him before the end of his preparations. It seems that three-quarters of a year passed before Hannibal moved on the Romans, still having only a very weak cavalry.
He had good reason for this. Scipio had not yet united with Masinissa; therefore, if it were possible to overtake him before this connection, or to stand between the allies and keep them apart, then the Punians would have been assured of victory. Scipio still did not hold any harbor in his hands and only had a stronghold fortified camp (castra Corneliana), located on a peninsula near Utica, which he unsuccessfully tried to take by attack. From here he moved inland and made several crossings through the fertile valley of Bagrad (Mejerda), ruining and devastating the country.
Then news reached him that Hannibal had marched against him from his assembly point, Hadrumet, and encamped at Zama, the more western of the two cities bearing that name.
Scipio's position was critical. If he remained, waiting in the valley of Bagrad, and Hannibal attacked him here before the arrival of the Numidian reinforcements, then defeat would be inevitable.
If he returned to his seaside camp, he would be locked up there by Hannibal, decisively cut off from Masinissa and completely dependent on the enemy with no hope of turning fate otherwise. His expedition will be wrecked - and it’s good if you can transport the army back to Sicily without heavy losses.
By this moment, the legend has timed the notorious personal negotiations between Hannibal and Scipio, in which the Carthaginian acts as the side asking for peace. There is no doubt that this meeting of the two generals, as Konrad Lehman establishes, was generated by the fantasy of Ennius. At that moment, Hannibal least of all thought about asking the Romans for peace, and Scipio was very far from absolute certainty of victory.
According to legend, three spies were captured in his camp, but he did not punish them, but in a proud consciousness of the superiority of his forces ordered to show them everything and let them go to Hannibal. This story is borrowed almost verbatim by Ennius from Herodotus from his "History of the Persian Wars", from Ennius he passed into Roman tradition, and then through Polybius was accepted into the current account of historiography. We see how cautiously we should treat the reports of our sources. We try to derive our judgments more from the general state of things than from these loose tangles of fantasy. Neither Scipio nor Hannibal lose one bit from such a critical approach to them. The same thing is repeated here that we have already observed in the study of the Persian Wars: in the right light, the heroism of the Greeks did not diminish at all when we reduced the size of the Persian army so much. A picture painted by legend and poetry should by no means be recognized as false because it is not painted with the colors that history is written with. They only speak another language, and the whole question is to correctly translate this language into the language of history.
Scipio was able to make a great decision, which places him in the ranks of the greatest generals of world history and imparts inner truth to all the poetic images invented by Ennius in his praise: this decision was that he placed all hopes on courage, he himself cut off the possibility of retreat, refused from communication with the sea, from the last chance of salvation in case of failure, and, realizing that it was dangerous to wait for Masinissa, he went to meet him inland. He took aside and walked away from Hannibal. Near the city of Naraggara, on the border of present-day Tunisia and Algeria, he connected with the troops of Masinissa and waited here for the arrival of Hannibal, who had no choice but to accept a decisive battle.
We have seen how the arrow of the balance wavered in this battle until the last moment. But if we want to comprehend in its entirety how much mental strength was needed in order to give the order to march on Naraggara, as well as to conduct the battle itself with imperturbable calmness, then we must weigh these two points in their mutual connection: the battle is considered in connection with the whole strategic situation, and the courage of a strategic step is measured by the sharpness with which the battle was played out.
The desperate courage of Scipio's decision was reflected in a very remarkable way in the incorrect name with which the tradition connects the battle up to the present day - Zama. Even after the victory, Scipio did not dare, in his message to Rome, to give his strategic conjuncture, to show in its entirety how this march was accomplished inland, away from the sea shores; he does not indicate the very place of the battle, mentioning only the name of the main headquarters of Hannibal during his last transition; this name began to designate the battle itself, and this obscured the whole strategic picture so much that historians could hesitate in choosing between Western and Eastern Zama. The march of Scipio can be compared with the movement of the Silesian army from Mulda through the Saale in October 1813, or with the retreat from Ligny to Wavre in 1815; both of these operations were a strategic victory over Napoleon. And if Scipio, instead of boasting about the unheard of boldness of his decision, prefers to hide and disguise the danger to which he was exposed on the way to victory, then this reminds us of the case of Moltke, when, fearing the vultures of criticism, he outlined his most brilliant and boldest strategic step - entry into Bohemia with a bifurcated army - as "application to unfavorable conditions of the situation."
Even after the Naraggar victory, Scipio, with his insignificant forces, could not think of the siege and capture of Carthage. Both morally and economically, Rome was so exhausted by a long war that she could not and did not want to allocate new funds for her; meanwhile, the groupings of the Greco-Macedonian states developed into such relations that Rome faced the urgent question of intervention and a new war. As before Scipio's departure for Africa, the Roman politicians disapproved of the expeditions and predicted failure, so after the victory they again raised their voices; but only now they pulled in the opposite direction and demanded the continuation of the struggle until a complete victory over the enemy, up to the destruction of Carthage. However, the victor at Naraggar showed that he knew how to correctly take into account not only his strength, but also its limitations. How often he was blamed for hastening to make peace, not wanting to cede to his successor the glory of final victory. This reproach, while claiming to be deadly witticism, showed only the jealousy of the critics, and should not be repeated today. Much time would have passed before the successor of Scipio in the fight against Hannibal and the impregnable walls of Carthage would have inherited this glory. Scipio better understood the benefits of his hometown and accepted the peace now offered at the urging of Hannibal. The conditions of this peace, in essence, were not very different from those that Scipio himself a year ago, before the arrival of Hannibal, set for the Punians and which the Roman people found at that time: quite acceptable. Thus, the significance of the battle of Naraggar was not so much in its positive side - in the very victory won by Rome here; it was rather of a negative order; Carthage was broken in its last rise, and its citizens lost hope for the future. The most important of the new conditions added to the peace treaty was that Carthage did not have the right to wage any kind of war without the consent of Rome, and, therefore, recognized its full sovereignty.
Of course, at the conclusion of peace, it would be difficult to say with certainty whether this condition would remain a dead letter or whether it would really put an end to independent Carthaginian politics. The humility of the conquered city depended in the future on international relations, on Macedonian and Syrian politics, on the internal development of Carthage and Rome. What happened next showed that the defeat at Naraggar finally broke the power of Carthage.
Six years later, in 195, when the Romans in a short time without the participation of Carthage also conquered Macedonia, the Carthaginians, at the request of the Romans, expelled Hannibal from their native city, and only this event gave the peace treaty its true meaning.
Knows two great generals world history- Hannibal and Napoleon, whose glory was not diminished by their final defeat. In the face of their greatness, history has always been tempted to judge their conquerors more severely than themselves, so as not to give the impression that the conqueror is superior to the vanquished. No matter how much the Romans exalt Scipio or the English the Wellington, however, in all cases where national pride was not involved, they are spoken of very restrainedly, and of Wellington even with some disdain; least of all, the one who most of all has the right to be called the winner of Napoleon in strategy, General Gneisenau, received recognition. Here, in general, it was difficult to talk about comparison with Napoleon, since the Prussian commander was not Gneisenau, but Blucher, and no one even thought of putting Blucher as a strategist along with Napoleon.
May history give this satisfaction to the vanquished, for their adversaries have received a generous reward in the very victory. We, however, in our special study must judge more carefully. We will talk about the generals of the new time later, but it should be said directly about Scipio that, as our entire presentation has already shown, he can rightfully claim a place, although, of course, not higher than Hannibal, but still next to him. Sober Rome, with its strict, authoritarian forms of statehood, does not allow the individual to advance independently as we saw it in Greece. The common feature - discipline - so prevails over everything personal that we are almost afraid to talk about a genius who must always have an extremely strong individuality. But, perhaps, one should not skimp on this word when it comes to a man who gave the Roman army new forms of tactics, ventured on an expedition to Africa and set out from the Bagrad valley to Naraggara - who firmly and confidently, through the most dangerous crisis, fought a battle with Hannibal and, finally, managed not to exceed the measures in his demands and conclude the right peace.
However, we know about Scipio not only these general abstract features of greatness, as they emerge from the events themselves. We have the opportunity to look directly into the commander's face in the portrait that Mommsen's creative power was able to recreate from various sources and with which I want to complete my description of the Second Punic War. By this study I have succeeded, I hope, in proving the great importance of Scipio as a general and statesman; it remains to supplement this evidence with the last decisive feature: Mommsen characterizes Scipio at the moment when he appears before the Roman people as a candidate for the post of commander-in-chief in Spain, where the Roman troops were utterly defeated.
"The son was on his way to avenge the death of his father, whom nine years ago he had saved his life on the banks of the Ticino; he was a courageously handsome, long-haired young man, modestly blushing with shame, when, in the absence of another, more worthy candidate, he volunteered to take a high but dangerous post; a simple military tribune, now at once erected at the choice of the centuries to the highest position - all this made an extraordinary and indelible impression on the Roman townspeople and peasants.
Indeed, the image of this hero is marked by some wonderful power of charm. That cheerful and confident, half sincere and half feigned enthusiasm, which he radiated around him, created a dazzling halo for him. He had enough fervent fantasy to fire hearts, and enough prudence to obey the dictates of prudence in everything and not lose sight of small details; he was not so naive as to share the blind faith of the crowd in his divine inspiration, and was not straightforward enough to destroy this faith himself; however, in the depths of his soul he was convinced that he was overshadowed by the special grace of the gods, in short - this was the real nature of the prophet; being placed above the people, he at the same time stood outside the people; he was unshakably faithful to the word once given and was distinguished by a royal turn of mind; however, he considered it a humiliation for himself to accept the ordinary royal title and at the same time could not even imagine that the state institutions of the republic would bind him like any other citizen; he was so sure of his greatness that he knew neither envy nor malice at all, condescendingly recognizing other people's merits and forgiving other people's mistakes; he was an excellent commander and a subtle diplomat without that repulsive imprint that is characteristic of both these ranks; a real Roman patriot with a Hellenic education, eloquent and courteous, Publius Scipio easily conquered the hearts of women and warriors, his countrymen and Spaniards, the hearts of his rivals in the senate and the heart of his greater (according to Mommsen - I would say differently) Carthaginian opponent. Soon his name was on everyone's lips, and he became a star, which, it seemed, was appointed to bring victory and peace to his homeland.
Note to the 3rd edition. 1. In the first two editions, I quoted Appian's story about the battle of Zama in full at this point, so that the reader can compare this version with mine and see directly what incorrect descriptions of battles we meet with ancient authors - descriptions that have nothing to do with actual events and should simply be discarded in toto. With regard to the named Appian story, no one denies this, since here we have a happy opportunity to draw truthful information from another source. But this is not enough. One must have the courage to reject apparently legendary tales even when we cannot replace them with something better.
It is not easy to decide on this, and only very gradually the scientific world gets used to the correct criteria. In view of this, I strongly recommend that the reader familiarize himself with Appian's story, but, unfortunately, for the sake of space, I myself must refuse to reprint it on these pages.
2. Feith, in his revised volume of his work "Die Antiken Schlachtfelder" (III, 2), in its main features, both tactical and strategic, adjoins that understanding of the campaign of 202, which was developed by Konrad Lehmann and myself; moreover, by extremely careful geographical and topographical research, he establishes the very place of the battle with all possible accuracy. In particular, he, like us, places the battle not under Zama, but under Naraggara and believes that the saving moment for the Romans was, firstly, the echelon tactics developed by Scipio in Spain, and secondly, the return of the cavalry, diverted first by the Punians. But I cannot agree with all that Faith found it possible to borrow from Polybius and weave into his construction.
Feith thinks that Leman and I were too skeptical about Polybius' story; he himself sees in this story only one indisputably erroneous moment - that incongruity that the Carthaginian citizens are depicted first as cowards, and then as brave men. But this error consists only in a misinterpretation of the conduct of the Carthaginians, and by no means distorts the facts themselves; such errors are quite excusable. I hold just the opposite opinion: in my opinion, one could forgive a single fact rather than such an explanation that claims to be convincing and at the same time is such an obvious absurdity that it disappears of itself. Be that as it may, there still remain such inconsistencies as the fact that Hannibal almost won the battle, although his two first lines fought among themselves; there remains the retreat of the Roman hastati due to the excessive amount of blood and corpses on the field. All these fables, obviously, came here from the same arsenal as Hannibal wigs, rowing on land, midday tides under New Carthage, and much more that Polybius, with all his critical flair, so thoughtlessly borrows from his sources. As for the tactical evolutions built on such material by Feit, they are absolutely fantastic pictures. This is all the more inevitable since defense plays a very prominent role in them with the help of 80 mythical elephants of Hannibal, and meanwhile, Feit, when calculating the forces (p. 681), himself comes to the conclusion that the Carthaginians had no more than 15-20 elephants.
It turns out that Scipio, because of these few elephants, radically changed the usual Roman battle order. This is all the less likely that elephants were usually used not against infantry, but against cavalry. The intention of Hannibal to move his elephants against the infantry in this battle, Scipio, according to Feit (p. 691), could learn from the fact that the elephants were in front, and, therefore, had to move first. I do not admit that Hannibal showed so little foresight.
As soon as he conceived something extraordinary, it was, of course, clear to him that his method would prove to be purely real if applied unexpectedly.
Consequently, Hannibal had to order that the elephants line up first, as usual, along with the cavalry, and only at the last minute come forward to cover the infantry; this could be done at the very end of the path - for several hundred steps. If all of the above is not enough, then this consideration alone clearly shows what a children's fairy tale this whole story is with elephants and with passages left in advance for them in the Roman system, so that the elephants obediently use these corridors kindly provided to them. How exactly Hannibal appears to have actually used his elephants has been outlined above.
The fact that the whole legend of the African campaign was intertwined with the conscious fiction of some poet, Konrad Lehman provided additional direct evidence by opening a similar story from Herodotus as a source of the story with spies ("Jahrb. f. klass., Philologie", 1896. , Bd. 153, No 68). Polybius had enough critical instinct to exclude the story of the duel between Scipio and Hannibal, which arose, of course, from the same source; however, the critic overlooked that the anecdote with spies, and the personal meeting of both commanders, and the battle of the Punians among themselves, and the battlefield impassable due to corpses and blood - all this is just as little worthy of faith. Old Lelius himself, confusing authentic reminiscences with the images of the Ennios poem, could tell Polybius these details, but the voice of criticism was silent. For even Thucydides was similarly deceived by his hospitable Spartan friend and took for truth his story of Pausanias' treason.
Another deviation of Feith from my conception is also very significant: he does not agree that Scipio left the region of Zama and reached Naraggara in order to receive reinforcements from Masinissa; according to Feit, the Roman army was in Naraggar even before the approach of Hannibal. If so, then in the most unexpected way we must greatly lower our opinion of the strategic abilities not only of Scipio, but also of his great adversary. The unheard-of bold decision of Scipio - to withdraw from the place and leave in a direction from which his return path was cut off - disappears, and Hannibal is reproached for leaving Hadrumet ahead of time without any urgent need and gave a decisive battle without completing the training camp. Meanwhile, if at the time of the appearance of the Carthaginians from Hadrumet, Scipio was standing in the vicinity of Zama, Hannibal, apparently, had in mind to attack him with superior forces - and then his premature sortie is justified; if Scipio was already in Naraggar, then his union with Masinissa should have been considered an already accomplished fact, and Hannibal had no reason to interrupt his preparatory work and, without gathering all his strength, set off on a campaign.
This, so to speak, depreciation of the value of two great historical figures, of course, could not serve as an argument against the facts, if these facts themselves were provable. In this case, however, we see the opposite.
The considerations given by Feit (p. 639) are very obscure and completely unconvincing. We have a similar case in the battle on Lechfeld, where in exactly the same way historical meaning The personality of the emperor Otto strongly depends on whether the battle took place on the left bank of the river or on the right.
My thesis, that Scipio himself later did not fully admit to the unheard-of audacity of his going to Naraggara, is dismissed by Faith (p. 641) as psychologically implausible; success, he believes, in the eyes of contemporaries even more than in the eyes of posterity, serves as a justification for risk. This argument about psychological improbability I can refute with historical analogies. When Napoleon, in 1800, went behind the lines of the Austrian army in order to cut off their retreat, he, in order to more accurately capture the enemy, had the audacity to divide his own army into several parts and send it along various roads that the Austrians could use. As a result, he was exposed to the extreme risk of being defeated at Marengo if the seconded Deshais did not arrive in time with reinforcements. However, it never occurred to Napoleon to boast after a victory of his courage (in which he would certainly have been justified); on the contrary, he simply gives a false account of the battle, turning boldness into wise foresight. To give another example, Moltke's greatest strategic act must undoubtedly be recognized as his entry into Bohemia with two divided armies, in danger that the main body of the Austrians might fall on one of them before the second could take its place. Although the introduction was brilliantly successful, the conceit of military critics did not bow to success; they constantly tried to prove that only unprecedented luck or an unprecedented oversight of the enemy brought Moltke victory, and the field marshal himself finally took up the pen (1867) to defend himself against these attacks.
Sann, in his "Untersuchungen zu Scipios Ferdzug in Afrika," p. 24, rightly dismisses the grounds on which Faith compels Scipio to go to Naraggara. But just as little convincing are his own arguments, with which he justifies the position of Scipio under Zama; Zann believes that Scipio hoped in this way to cover the advance of Masinissa. This would be a gross mistake. Where did Masinissa come from?
Of course, from the west. Why would Scipio, covering his allies, expose his own army to the danger of attack by the superior forces of Hannibal, when he could simply have indicated to the Numidians that they should join the Romans along one of the more northern roads mentioned in the sources.
Let me sum up the debate. If the battle took place at Naraggar, then the arrival of Scipio in this area has only one explanation: under the pressure of necessity, the Roman makes a heroic choice and, seeing in courage the only way to salvation and victory, leaves Hannibal inland, all the way to Naraggara, so that here connect with Masinissa. Feit's explanation that Scipio went here of his own free will cannot be considered satisfactory. If the battle took place at Zama, then it is not clear why Hannibal accepted it. He expected from Vermina another strong body of cavalry, who actually joined him a few weeks after the battle. That he nevertheless accepted the battle of Naraggar, already knowing about the connection of Scipio with Masinissa, will seem quite natural if we consider how far he went in pursuit of the enemy, and in what an unfavorable strategic position he put Scipio; if both troops converged in the vicinity of Zama, then Hannibal lost very little
would have gained very much by postponing the decisive battle for a few more weeks and in the meantime receiving the much-needed cavalry reinforcements from Vermina. So Faith is right when he assigns Zama as the place where the battle took place; but he is wrong in accepting an unsatisfactory explanation for Naraggara (a march inland to devastate the area).
Feit is mistaken in thinking (p. 658) that the maneuver by which Scipio lengthened his front at the expense of a second (or third) line was, in my opinion, a surprise to the Carthaginians. After all, I myself say that Scipio developed echelon tactics back in Spain and applied it in battles on the Great Plains. Hannibal, of course, knew this and, therefore, was prepared for such tricks by Scipio. Nevertheless, Hannibal counted on victory and was to some extent right, since he had an advantage in the infantry; and even according to the testimony of the Romans themselves, Hannibal, thanks to this superiority, would have inevitably won a victory if the Roman Numidian cavalry had not returned in time and attacked the Carthaginians from the rear.
One of the most significant results of my research in the field of military science among the ancients was the assertion that the Romans developed echelon tactics only during the Second Punic War under the command of Scipio. The first person to agree with me at a time when Mommsen stubbornly denied it was Fröhlich. He responded to my work with the article: "Die Bedeutung des zweiten punischen Krieges für die Entwicklung des römischen Heerwesens", 1884. Kromeyer and Veit now also agreed with my point of view. “Scipio’s echeloning of the Roman battle order in depth into three independent lines and his brilliant flank evolutions, made possible only by this innovation, is what wrested victory from the hands of his great opponent,” writes Kromeyer. This is absolutely true, but it is in conflict with Kromeyer's idea that the Romans from time immemorial owned the art of maneuvering the smallest tactical units - maniples.
To all who knew such art, the flanking movements, as Scipio did at Naraggar, not only did not represent anything special, but were simple; moreover, one can even say that for them the Scipio system would not be a progress, but a step backwards, not an improvement in tactics, but, on the contrary, a transition to cruder forms. Even Kromeyer and Faith could not fail to see that between the helpless immobility of Roman tactics at Cannae and the Naraggar maneuvering there must have been some significant transformation, and that one of Scipio's great deeds must be sought here. But wishing at the same time to preserve the idea of the extraordinary subtlety of the imaginary ancient Roman Quincunx-Taktik (checkerboard tactics), they fall into an insoluble internal contradiction.
When I first (in "Histor. Zeitschr.", Bd. 51, 1883) published my discovery (as I dare to call it), the main objection, which I raised myself, was that Polybius not only nothing does not report any reforms in Roman infantry tactics during the Second Punic War, but even clearly knows nothing about them.
At the present time the question has been so clarified that this objection is no longer put forward by anyone; even Kromeyer, at this decisive moment, now joins my theory. But I want to draw attention to one more thing: a man like Polybius is in the dark about such an important event as the military reform of Scipio! Whoever correctly weighs this fact will not fail to draw a further methodological consequence from this - that we must be extremely skeptical about all the details, all the turns of speech of ancient writers when they relate to questions of tactics. How little contemporaries can sometimes know about the most fundamental reforms of tactics - even writers specializing in military affairs - the reader can judge if he reads Volume IV of this work (p. 466), which contains the arguments of a very competent person - Goyer (Nouet) - on the Statement of Affairs in the French Revolutionary Troops. Here one can also point out that 100 years after Frederick the Great, the Prussian general staff knew nothing about his strategy (cf. vol. IV, p. 438).
It can be assumed that Hannibal returned to Africa in the autumn of 203 and that the battle of Naraggar takes place in August 202 (Leman, p. 555).
Proven by Konrad Neman.
Berliner Dissert. 1914
"Rome Kampf urn die Weltherrschaft", p. 61
Women's question
Genius is more than the ability to act at full strength. This is the ability to clearly see the surrounding reality and be guided by it. Only a few men have been endowed with such a gift for a long time. Napoleon Bonaparte had it in his younger years. When he moved his huge army to Moscow, he believed that it was so destined by fate. So, of course, it was, only fate turned out to be not what Napoleon imagined for himself.
The young Publius Scipio was perhaps the only one of all the Roman leaders who realized that in reality their enemy was Carthage, the city, and not Hannibal, the man. In Spain, he realized a truth that had eluded the higher command. Long after him, Henry IV of France remarked that "Spain is a country in which large armies starve to death and small ones are destroyed." (Napoleon learned this the hard way.)
Scipio found himself on a huge peninsular semi-desert plateau, where the cities were at a great distance from one another, and the supply was scarce; where, over vast expanses, horsemen were more appropriate, and not the slow infantry that had proven itself so well in the small Italian valleys. He very quickly understood why the Carthaginians kept themselves in three separate formations - to support themselves. They were located in separate camps, and fought all together. If he starts chasing one of these formations, the other two may follow him, as they did, destroying his father and his uncle. And Scipio kept his army close to the base at New Carthage, the terminus of the sea route to Rome, not far from the important mines of the Silver Mountains. In these mines, silver was mined every day in the amount of 20,000 drachmas, which was vital for the exhausted Rome.
Scipio knew he could not afford the luxury of delay. Behind him, Rome was in the grip of severe economic exhaustion, spending what was left of its temple treasures to raise new legions, put down more rebellions (even in Eritrea), and lose more lives in battle. This required even more legions to replace while Hannibal waited like a conjurer watching his trick play out. (And Scipio hurried Lelia with tons of precious silver and trophies for the temple of Jupiter, who was called his father.)
Hannibal's great shadow hung over all of Eastern Spain. Iberians of aristocratic origin remembered his courteous manner. In the Castulonian citadel, above the mines, his wife bore him a son. The militant Celtiberians and Ilergets awaited his word. Almost all of these taciturn, introspective people had relatives in his Italian army. Scipio understood that it was useless to unleash a campaign in Spain until he managed to win the support of at least part of its inhabitants. Perhaps Scipio's environment suggested to him another, simpler idea. The best way to fight Hannibal was to imitate him.
Scipio's condition was now close to that of that mysterious African on the banks of the Trebbia, during a hailstorm. He felt how strained his strength was on that hot day in Cannes. Those hours left scars on his soul. He mournfully thought about them in the darkness at the deserted tomb of Jupiter. Scipio felt a growing contempt for his fellow military leaders, who complained loudly about the degenerate African, this cruel monster, choreographer of countless tricks, the treacherous Phoenician. Scipio's main desire was to understand the true nature of Hannibal.
It was incredibly difficult for a Roman who grew up surrounded by death masks and testimonies of the valor of his ancestors to forget about all these traditions and become himself. This European could not fully understand the Eastern Semites, but he could follow the thought of another person. Scipio prepared to use his own weapons against Hannibal.
After the first hours of bloodletting and looting in New Carthage (a tradition of Roman troops after the capture of enemy cities), Scipio ordered his legions to sheathe their swords. Moreover, he demanded that the native Spaniards not be treated as enslaved tribes. He put the captive artisans to work in the shipyard and promised them freedom after the end of the war. He needed these Spaniards to expect a reward from Roman rule, and in his plans he imagined that Roman Iberia would supply precious silver every year. As a confirmation of his good will, he released all the Iberian and Celtiberian hostages that he found in New Carthage. All of them were relatives of the ruling chiefs. Scipio effectively declared to them:
The Senate and the people of Rome will release you from your strict Phoenician masters. Henceforth you will have law and order and be protected by the Roman people, who always triumph over their enemies.
Scipio knew how to win sympathy. He perfectly understood the instinctive desire of the barbarian leaders to be on the side of the victors. He also correctly counted on the influence that noble Iberian women exerted on their husbands. In early youth, he experienced the influence of ardent girls and married ladies. He believed that women were individuals in addition to performing the childbearing and domestic duties required of Latin wives. His legionnaires touched on the "women's" theme in one of their rude songs:
Publius Cornelius says: Gold is for centurions, Silver - for triarii, And all the hot girls - For Publius Cornelius.
Among the hostages was one Iberian woman who took all the girls and little children under her wing. She was the daughter-in-law of one of the influential leaders of the tribe. Scipio put on a show when he received this Iberian lady. Through his interpreters, he greeted her in a special way. He personally distributed toys to small children. This woman's thoughts seemed to be on something else. She made this clear to the young Roman general, who wore his snow-white toga as a robe of honor. Surprised at first, Scipio understood the cause of her anxiety. She feared for the blooming girls crowding behind her. Then he called to himself several young military leaders. In front of the woman, he announced to them that these noble Iberian girls should under all circumstances be treated as sisters of Scipio.
This gallant scene, however, was interrupted by an unexpected complication. Several young military leaders brought one Spanish girl of their choice. She was a dark-eyed beauty from an unknown family, who was chosen by zealous youths for the joy of their proconsul. After a moment of stupor, Scipio deftly wriggled out of his awkward position. This girl, he declared, was beautiful and attractive; accordingly, her family must be informed that, by order of the proconsul, she will be returned to the custody of her father.
Whatever the effect of this attitude towards women, Scipio won the friendship of Indibil and several influential leaders from the east coast, from New Carthage to Tarraco across the Ebro River. There, in the north, the Ylergets were at least calm, but the strong Celtiberians of the mid-plains remained true to their alliance with the Carthaginians. Scipio created a myth about himself, a myth about his personal benevolence. This myth will disappear at the first defeat from the Carthaginian weapons.
Scipio paid attention to everything. To compensate for the weakness of his cavalry, he came into contact with the Moors and Numidians on the nearby African coast. In addition, he tirelessly drilled his obedient legions. Since they cannot maneuver at the speed of the Carthaginian cavalry, they must at least move swiftly from place to place. Following this tactic, he completely abandoned the traditional hard frontal movement of the massive triple line of legions. (Hannibal broke this formation from the front, surrounding it from the flanks and from the rear with his strike force. Scipio witnessed this happen at Cannae.) He also quickly rearmed the Romans with longer, double-edged Spanish swords and formidable iron darts. They later became everyday weapons in Caesar's army. Both words, gladius (sword) and pilum (javelin), owe their origin to the Spanish Celts.
Scipio was surprised to find how few true Carthaginians fought. His enemies relied on an alliance with other, more physically strong peoples. Alliances, as Scipio saw firsthand in Italy, could collapse out of fear or the possibility of higher rewards elsewhere. In addition, the young Roman commander was perplexed about how strange the chambers left by Hannibal and Hasdrubal in the palace above the harbor in New Carthage were. There were no military paraphernalia or trophies in the rooms of the Barca brothers. In the corner wall niches were altars and papyri with Greek texts for reading. The only mask found was not posthumous, but theatrical. There was also found a map of the Iberian Peninsula, skilfully executed on a silver plate. On it, as in a picture, roads, mountain ranges and rivers were depicted. In Rome, Scipio had only a sheet with the indication of distances on the roads of Italy from one place to another. He carefully memorized the image of Spain as he prepared to march against his enemy.
In the summer of 208 BC. e. Hasdrubal forced the Romans to turn against him. Hannibal's brother settled for winter quarters in the central lands among the Carpetans. Now he was marching southeast, towards the spurs of the Silver Mountains near Castulon. In doing so, he posed a threat to the mines owned by the Romans. Scipio had to leave the coast in order to move southwest into the mountains. In doing this, he did not for a moment forget that, approaching one Carthaginian army, he had no idea where the other two might be.
Hasdrubal in Becula
“Hasdrubal was always a brave man,” Polybius tells us. “He defeated with a determination worthy of his father Barca. Most commanders do not realize the consequences of failure... but Hasdrubal left nothing unattended in his preparation for the fight. It seems to me that he is worthy of our respect and imitation.”
Without a doubt, Scipio had respect for his rival. Shortly before this, the witty Hasdrubal made a laughingstock of one very capable Roman general, Claudius Nero. Nero managed to drive the Carthaginian army into one of the dead end valleys of Spain, much like Fabius did with Hannibal in Italy. Then Hasdrubal began negotiations with Nero, discussing the conditions for leaving the valley all week, and his army, meanwhile, got out of the trap behind him. At the end of the week, Hasdrubal broke off negotiations to leave himself, while Scipio arrived to replace Nero. Hasdrubal and Nero were destined to meet again, but not in Spain.
Probably Scipio was not sure that Hannibal forced his brother to leave Spain that summer, but the senate gave him orders not to allow Hasdrubal to cross the Pyrenees.
Scipio discovered the Carthaginians in an elongated valley under the city of Becula. Hasdrubal encamped on a low plateau, sheltered behind hills, with a small stream flowing below. It was not possible to calculate the number of his troops. (In fact, Hasdrubal had 25,000 Africans and Spaniards under his command, while the Roman army numbered 30,000, and an unknown number of Spanish allies.)
The position was difficult to attack, but Scipio had to attack. He did it carefully, crossing the river. After a long delay at the bottom of the plateau, Scipio ascended it with lightning speed. He regrouped his troops, leaving the weaker light units in the center, while the heavily armed legions, commanded by Lelius and himself, climbed up the dry channels at the ends of the plateau to the flanks. Thus, he encircled the Carthaginian camp, placing the largest forces on the flanks.
This maneuver of Scipio was successful after a hard fight on the slopes of the plateau. He took the Carthaginian camp in pincers, crushing the lightly armed forces of Hasdrubal, destroying or capturing 8,000 enemy soldiers. His legionnaires plundered the camp.
However, the Carthaginian heavily armed forces left, along with 32 elephants and all the horsemen. Hasdrubal was heading towards the Pyrenees.
Scipio could not follow. Two other Carthaginian armies were waiting for him, watching him, and New Carthage had to be defended. Scipio sent reinforcements north to the mouth of the Ebro, where Hannibal had crossed ten years earlier.
Hasdrubal nonetheless headed north with his small mobile army to the headwaters of the Tagus. Somewhere along the way, he conferred with Magon. They decided that Magon would go first to the Balearic Islands for a new replenishment of slingers, and then return by sea to Northern Italy, where all three sons of Hamilcar Barca would meet. Hasdrubal moved to the Pyrenees, to the western pass, guarded by friendly Basques. In the distant land of the Celts, he too found himself among friendly peoples and carried many people with him, heading towards the Rhone (autumn had come and it was too late to try to cross the Alps).
Rumors of Hasdrubal's approach reached Rome via Marseilles. The city was still mourning the death of two consuls at the hands of Hannibal. It seemed that the angry gods were attacking the Roman leaders who opposed the Carthaginian magician. Not a single person remained who proved his abilities. Old age made Fabius bankrupt. As for the young Scipio, he had some success, but he let Hasdrubal slip away, and in any case could not abandon his army in Spain. And here again, ten years later, Rome felt itself in danger. In the north, Etruria was leaving the union; Liguria helped the Cisalpine Gauls.
“All these failures fell to our lot,” people said, “when we were opposed by one enemy army and one Hannibal. Now Italy will have two mighty armies and two Hannibals.”
The new Carthaginian will appear just in the most dangerous place, on the Po River. Wouldn't Hannibal himself be able to finish the job after that?
During the elections in the crisis year, two consuls were elected - two people who did not enjoy special fame. Claudius Nero, who had campaigned against Hasdrubal in Spain, became patrician consul. His task was to control the actions of Hannibal. A certain Livy, who had no desire to serve, became a plebeian consul and was to take command of the northern army. Elections, the ritual of sacrifice and the planning of military operations were carried out, as in all previous times, in accordance with Roman traditions. No one really expected that Nero and Livy would be equal to the two sons of Hamilcar Barca.
Message from the Po
After the snow melted (207 BC), Hasdrubal crossed the Alps more successfully than Hannibal, and apparently by the same pass. As before, the Roman command hoped to intercept the Carthaginians in the mountains. But the aliens descended down the Po River, replenishing their ranks with harsh Ligurians and raising the spirit of the windy Gauls. They locked up the Roman advance forces in Placentia, as Hannibal did, and rounded the Apennine range from the south and east. Hasdrubal still had a dozen surviving elephants, and he moved quickly.
Here an event occurred that had consequences for the entire Mediterranean. Leaving the banks of the Po, Hasdrubal sent a message to his brother. In it, he appointed a meeting of their armies in Umbria, on the Adriatic coast. Six horsemen, four Gauls and two Numidians, carried this letter. Some of them must have been told what it contained. Probably, one of the Gauls paved the way for them to the south, bypassing the enemy camps, to the positions of Hannibal in Lucania.
Hannibal was there, but he broke through the line of the Romans to the Adriatic coast. At this point, he was returning back to gather his scattered detachments and move north, overcoming strong resistance, into the valley of the river Ophid, where the battlefield of Cannae was nearby.
Messengers from the Po tried to follow him, but were captured by Roman foragers near Tarentum. Hasdrubal's letter was given to Claudius Nero, not Hannibal.
At that moment, an agitated Nero was struck by one of those foresights that allows ordinary people to do extraordinary things. He put his thought into the following words: "The situation is developing in such a way that it is no longer possible to wage further war by conventional means." He left his army opposed to Hannibal, and with one legion of choice and a thousand cavalry armed with lances, he moved from his territories in the south to join Libya in the north and tell him the news of Hasdrubal's rendezvous. He sent a letter to the Senate with an explanation, but did not wait for permission to leave his army. Instead, he sent messengers ahead with orders that the villages along his route should deliver to the roads replacement horses, mules, carts - everything that tired people could move on. The pace he had set could only be sustained by the Legion.
(It is often said, though not true, that Nero exhausted his army and left behind the usual number of burning campfires to deceive Hannibal. He took only 7,000 men with him, and left over 30,000 in fortified positions near the river, while while other forces held Tarentum behind Hannibal's lines, Nero simply realized that he could not waste precious days until one of the Carthaginian brothers knew what the other was doing, while the Romans knew what they were both doing.)
Hannibal waited at Ophid for a message that never reached him, unable to move north without finding out which road Hasdrubal would take south. The legion sent by him with a mounted escort brought him no information. For once, mounted intelligence failed him.
Hasdrubal, passing Rimini, went to the Adriatic coast. Like trained dogs gathering together at the appearance of a bear, the Roman formations were pulled together east of the Apennines. They were going under the command of Livy south of the Metaurus River. Having crossed over it near the city of Fan, the Carthaginians found the formation of the Romans in front of them. The places were unfamiliar to Hasdrubal, although there were Gauls with him who knew these roads. He paused for a moment to study the situation, perhaps in the hope of receiving guidance from Hannibal.
Nero went to the borders of the Romans near the Gallic Seine under the cover of night. He warned in advance that no news should be spread about his approach. Under the cover of darkness, his exhausted men gathered in the tents of Livy's army to avoid putting up new tents. Livy and his staff insisted that the legion, who had come from the south, rest before the battle, but Nero, who knew Hannibal from personal experience, assured that procrastination is like death. The Roman army must attack immediately. That's what they decided on.
However, the violation of discipline almost failed both consuls. The reconnaissance detachment of the Carthaginians noticed the presence in the enemy camp of people who showed all signs of fatigue after a hard march. And the trumpeter, who called Livy to battle in front of the tent, had to blow his trumpet twice, contrary to the established rule. The astute Hasdrubal realized that he was confronted by two Roman consuls instead of one, and that the enemy's forces had increased. He pulled back his own units and that night tried to slip into the headwaters of the Metaurus in order to escape along the Via Flaminius to the south. His march to the west began well, but the guides could not find their way to this road in the darkness. When dawn broke, the Romans barred his way to the Flaminian Way. Perhaps he could have withdrawn to the Po River, but instead he drew up his troops in preparation for battle.
The Battle of Metaurus is known as one of those that changed the course of history. In this battle, for the last time, the Italians stood in line against the Roman legions, the forerunners of Caesar's empire. Hasdrubal arranged his army into national groups - Ligurians, Gauls and Spanish-Africans. He gave the elephants to the Ligurians. For some time, huge animals burst into the ranks of the approaching Romans. Replenishment of Ligurians and Gauls rushed into the river. They did not have time to come to the aid of Hasdrubal.
For several hours there was no advantage on either side. But then Claudius Nero upset the balance of power. He was at the very end of the right flank of the Roman line with 7,000 warriors occupying a small hill, protected by a shallow ravine. The enemies that were in front of him turned out to be Gauls, and the Gauls didn’t do anything but cross the ravine to face him. Seeing the Gauls in front of him and hearing the sounds of the trumpet and warlike cries at the other end of the long line, Nero realized that the legions of Livy in this place were tightly soldered to the Spanish-Africans of Hannibal. After listening to all this long enough, he left his position again. At the same time, he left part of his cavalry, which was to act energetically on the crest of the hill.
Then he led his weary legion around the battlefield.
Nero passed behind the line of the Romans, along the road, to come out on the flank in the rear of Hasdrubal's heavily armed troops. His legion was still intact and intact. This had a decisive influence on the hand-to-hand combat of tired people.
When his ranks faltered, Hasdrubal rode up to his warriors to raise their spirits, and was killed. After that, the disciplined Romans advanced deeply towards the leaderless group of allies. The Gauls, who suffered little, left, and the reinforcements turned back along with the fugitives. There were survivors among the Spanish-Africans, but there was no one who could take the place of Hasdrubal. His army has ceased to exist. In the Carthaginian camp, the legions of Livy freed 4,500 Roman prisoners. The Roman army had suffered greatly, but was still able to fight and emboldened by its unexpected victory.
That night, Claudius Nero led his legion south. After six days of an amazing campaign (210 miles), he again returned to his camp near the Ophid River. He walked at such a speed that the villagers along his route knew nothing about the battle that had taken place before his arrival.
At the Roman Forum, the senate sat from dawn to dusk. Citizens came and went, crowding around stands and temples, catching every word coming from the fronts of the battle.
“There are vague rumors that two riders from the city of Narnia have appeared at the Umbra Gate with the message that the enemy has been utterly defeated. At first, no one believed it. But then a letter arrived from Lucius Manlius, concerning the news brought by horsemen from Narnia. This letter was delivered through the Forum to the curia. People in such impatience and confusion rushed there that the messenger could not approach the doors of the curia. Suddenly a rumor spread that the riders themselves were approaching the city. People of all ages rushed to run to see everything with their own eyes and hear with their own ears the good news. The crowd rushed to the Milvian bridge ... Since the consuls Marcus Livius and Gaius Claudius [Nero] survived with their armies And destroyed the enemy leaders with their legions, the senate announced a three-day prayer of thanksgiving.
As soon as Nero again occupied his camp on the banks of the Ophid, he ordered that "Hasdrubal's head, which he brought with him and carefully kept, was thrown to the enemy outpost. And that the chained African captives be exposed to the enemy. Moreover, two of them should have been freed from their chains and sent to Hannibal to tell him what had happened.
Everything was done as he ordered.
The two consuls, on their return to Rome, were given a solemn welcome. Then the senate ordered that Etruria and Umbria be cleared of those who provided assistance of any kind to Hasdrubal.
The rejoicing in Rome continued for many months. People heard that Hannibal, the son of Hamilcar, received the head of his brother and immediately withdrew his troops from Ophid. Taking with him many of the Lucanians, he liberated the Gulf of Taranto as far as Metapontum and withdrew into the mountains of Bruttia. Here, on the border of Italy, he waited. No one dared to attack him.
"The Romans also did not provoke him while he was inactive - so they believed in the strength of this one man, around whom everything collapsed."
End of Barkid rule
For the first time since he left New Carthage twelve years ago, Hannibal lost the initiative in a great war. Perhaps he thought with irony that his enemies, with their huge forces in Italy, make no attempt to oppose him. True, he did not allow them to understand how weak his own troops had become. Only the backbone of his Italian army survived, plus a few Lucanian peasants, Greek sailors, Roman deserters, and uncouth Bruttian mountaineers. Probably, his name, covered with incredible legends, served as his only defense.
In this extremity of Italy he still held larger possessions than Carthage itself. He had ports, though very small, at Locri and Croton, near the beautiful temple at Cape Lacinium. He had enough food for his people and even a supply of silver for their needs. Hannibal inevitably had to consider whether he should take a ship and try to get by sea to Africa and Spain, where his thoughts were now directed. Perhaps the feeling of fatality after the death of Hasdrubal made him wait for the fight on his hills. He was probably clear about the harsh fact that if he left Bruttium, his army would disintegrate, while in Spain Magon and other Carthaginian commanders received reinforcements from Carthage in manpower and ships. And almost certainly he expected the Roman consuls to fall with all their might on his last possessions. As a Carthaginian, he yearned to avenge the scornfully discarded head of Hasdrubal.
For the next year, the news, which he received little by little from the incoming ships, aggravated his anxiety. After the harvest, a convoy of grain ships from Spain ended the famine on the Tiber River. The fields of Latium began to be cultivated again. Ship crews released from the fleets returned to agriculture again.
On the other side of the Adriatic, the king of Macedonia felt a change of fate and made peace with the Aetolians, henchmen of Rome. This ended Carthage's brief alliance with Syracuse and Macedon. ("If you are defeated, even your friends will abandon you.")
And then there was a terrible defeat in Spain. Under Ilipa, Magon and the Carthaginian generals, including the Numidian Masinissa, mobilized all their great forces in battle with the young Roman proconsul. During the battle, Scipio moved his ranks to cut into the flanks of the Carthaginians and drive their remnants to the ocean. Hades remained the last support, and Hannibal knew that its inhabitants, like the Macedonians, would not support Carthage if necessary. Now, if he could be under Ilipa before the start of this battle!
Hades began to flirt with Scipio, and the Romans entered the city. Ancient Hades, like Tarentum, opened its gates to rulers who would never leave it.
Part of the Iberians and Celtiberians began to resist, but it was too late. Indibil escaped from the Romans, but was quickly overtaken. Lost in the mountains, the fortress of the Illurgis resisted the Roman siege technique, and its men and women died in the streets from the swords of the legionnaires. The city of Astapa burned down along with its inhabitants. Hannibal knew them well. Castulon, his wife's family stronghold, has surrendered. Far to the north, the Ilergetes and Edetanes plundered Roman supplies. The legions of Scipio drove them into the valley and cut them to pieces.
Scipio achieved submission by the power of fear. The Spanish military detachments fought with him against their feudal enemies. Scipio rewarded them all. But with his own people, he could be merciless. Across the river Ebro, one of the legions rebelled against his command. Scipio summoned 35 instigators to New Carthage. There they were surrounded by his legionnaires and whipped to death at the pillory.
In the new year, the Romans started deadly games in New Carthage. Sword-wielding gladiators entered the arena, feigning battle in the name of the god of war. After the pantomime ended, the blood in the arena was washed away and incense was lit in its place.
Hannibal thought sadly of the young Scipio, who so resembled Fabius and at the same time did not resemble him. Be that as it may, Scipio achieved complete dominance over Spain. The power of the Barkid family ended after a little over thirty years.
Magon survived. He committed reprisals against some of the judges of Hades. Then, with several ships and 2000 supporters, he entered the bay and unexpectedly approached New Carthage from the sea. Losing strength, he sailed to the Pitius Islands and the Isle of Minora to recruit the Gam people, as they had planned with Hasdrubal. From Croton, Hannibal sent a message to Carthage, saying that Magon had landed on the Ligurian coast to lead the resistance there and prevent the legions from occupying the line of the Po River.
Having landed in the harbor of Genoa, Magon disappeared into the foothills. The brothers were very far apart: Magon at the Alps, and Hannibal at the tip of Italy.
As the thirteenth year of the war began, the Romans in Italy seemed to go into hibernation. They were exhausted. They had a lot to restore and process even more. After all the hardships of recent years, they were glad to rest. Publius Cornelius Scipio, with his perspicacity, resolutely opposed this hibernation.
Feast at Good Syphax
The great battle of Zama, in which Scipio opposed Hannibal, did not begin at all in the hot spring of 202 BC. e. It had begun a few years earlier in the mind of Publius Scipio, and what he had done during those years had much to do with what had happened on the plain at Zama.
Already in May 206 BC. e. (shortly after Ilipa) Scipio made the first attempt to reach Africa. What happened to him there is completely unbelievable and resembles an adventure novel, but it really happened.
After Ilipa, as usual, the young proconsul sent splendid booty to Rome, where he longed for an important political post. He hoped, with the help of the now experienced army and his gifted generals Marcius and Lelia, to take possession of the rest of Spain. Having finished this, he was going to cross the strait to take the war to Africa and force Hannibal to leave Italy and return to the defense of Carthage. This idea was as simple as any brilliant idea. His father had had this idea before him, and began to negotiate diplomatically with Syphax, king of the Numidians, who had previously supplied horses to Hannibal. The elder Publius Scipio planned to turn Spain into a base for an African expedition, as Hannibal did before going to Rome. What Hannibal did was a fine example worthy of emulation.
Perhaps when the young Scipio plunged into the pentecontor in the port of Tarracon and went to sea, he did not imagine that he was changing the essence of his republic: it ceases to be an Italian state and becomes an empire stretching across the sea to new horizons. This was, of course, the cherished dream of the heads of the Aemilia and Scipio families. Scipio himself, however, was simply a general in the army, to whom consular power was transferred in case of extreme danger. Moreover, his authority did not go beyond the Pyrenees. (Nero threatened to bring disgrace on himself and the entire Claudian family when he risked making a march from southern Italy and became famous for it.) Scipio's power actually ended with the conquest of Spain - upon returning to Rome, nothing awaited him but the usual parade and the admiration of his wife . Instead, Scipio sought with all his heart to win the war over Hannibal. The fact that it was as incredible as piling Mount Pelion on Mount Ossa did not stop him.
The short sea voyage was pleasant, if risky. Scipio received only guarantees of safety from the king of the wild and unreliable people of Syphax, who insisted on their personal meeting on the African coast. Another pentekontor escorted the proconsul's vessel, more for reasons of prestige than security. Both ships rounded Cape Shiga - the meeting place. In the small harbor, seven Carthaginian galleys were at anchor in the breeze. At the sight of the Roman ships, the sailors lined up in the galleys, ready for battle.
With amazing courage, Scipio continued to direct his pentekontors to the harbor, not stopping at the battle posts. A gust of wind drove them past the Carthaginian galleys to the pier, where they could, as guests, count on the patronage of the African king. The Carthaginian sailors understood this and did nothing.
In the halls of the owner, Scipio met face to face with another guest, a Carthaginian. It was Hasdrubal, son of Gisgon, a shrewd middle-aged aristocrat, who commanded the troops with Mago, son of Hamilcar, at Ilipa! Scipio must have been momentarily taken aback.
Syphax arranged a gala dinner in honor of their meeting. He was glad to see the eminent rivals in the war in Spain reconciled in his house. Elderly and experienced in difficult negotiations, Syphax was proud of his ability to manage the warlike Numidians. His capital Cirta was located on the border with the possessions of Carthage, and Syphax treated with all the respect of a member of the tribe to the six-story houses there and the huge temple of Iolaus. He also had a growing respect for the Roman victories in Iberia and for the general with the eagle profile who could so freely enter his door. Syphax was able to mobilize tens of thousands of skilled riders; however, he understood that he should not offend the Romans, but at the same time he could not turn his back on the Carthaginians. Over the meal, Scipio described (through interpreters) in the most ardent terms the advantages of the Roman form of government.
Syphax, who was not eager to take a personal part in the war, advised Scipio to take advantage of the opportunity to establish friendly relations with Hasdrubal. Scipio replied that he was glad to do so. He did not feel hostile towards his enemy - moreover, he found his company pleasant.
The Numidian concluded:
Then why not settle for peace?
Scipio said that it was quite another matter.
He is just one of the military commanders, carrying out the orders of the Senate and the Roman people, who decide when it is possible to end the war and make peace.
This man, - said Hasdrubal to the owner of the house after the departure of Scipio, - is even more dangerous in conversation than in battle.
The Roman took with him the promise of Syphax to become an ally. The Carthaginian was assured that he would never cease to be a friend of Carthage.
Scipio, however, had other thoughts. Most of all he needed good African horsemen. To get them, he won over to his side the brilliant chief of the cavalry, who contributed to the death of his father and fought against Scipio himself at Ilipa. Masinissa, king of the Massilians, was educated in Carthage. He was devoted to Carthage until he saw that the remnants of the Carthaginian army were sent west to the island of Hades, where the cavalry could not operate. In addition, Masinissa was indebted to Scipio, who freed his young nephew from captivity. And Scipio was not afraid to meet Masinissa alone at the hour of the night. The leader of the African rebels fell victim to the charm of the Roman and his own ambitions. At this point, he was disinherited. Masinissa promised that when the proconsul landed with his army on the African coast, he would join him with numerous Numidian cavalry.
Now Masinissa - it was obvious - was going to keep his word, while Syphax had no such intention. However, Masinissa did not have the opportunity. He was little more than a fugitive to Spain, while Syphax was both powerful and powerful. Scipio was not interested in the fact that Masinissa hated the very name of Syphax.
Something nevertheless worried him greatly, because he abandoned his plan to invade Africa across the strait. Perhaps he realized after visiting Syphax that the long march along the coast to Carthage was inappropriate? Maybe he was afraid for his base in Spain? At that time, there, in the hinterland, a wave of resistance swept. The Ilurgis fought to the death; Astapa's women and children huddled inside the ramparts, ready to be burned by their men rather than surrender to the Romans. Hannibal's shadow still lay on the ground.
Scipio founded a colony in the beautiful Bethys Valley, which was to be "Latinized" in the future. Leaving his army behind, but taking with him the priceless Lelia, he boarded a ship bound for Rome. It was the eve of elections in the new year.
Fabius opposes Scipio
Immediately after his arrival, the conqueror of Spain met with opposition in the person of senior senators. Because he left his command post without permission, ancient law forbade him from entering the city. His behavior caused the senators to leave the walls of the Senate to hear him at the temple of Bellona, sister of Mars. And here his convictions prevented him from winning the triumphal entry, which he boldly demanded. Only the winner in the rank of consul was honored with a solemn meeting, which was not Publius Cornelius Scipio.
It was exactly what the young warrior wanted. Because of his popularity, the senate could not help but allow him to enter the city as a common citizen through the city gates. Taking advantage of this, Scipio made a whole spectacle of his appearance: he was followed by veterans and Spanish captives, and in front of him were wagons with silver ingots. The people have always been eager for spectacles, especially with trumpets and trophies. After this, Scipio led the whole procession to the temple of Jupiter, his divine patron, to sacrifice at least 30 bulls, and gained another huge audience. According to legend, he was as flawless as his snow-white toga. Future clients would gather at his door in the morning, waiting for him to show up. His sayings became famous on the Via Sacra. Every day it was a new statement, always brilliant and unexpected.
"I didn't come to wage war - I'm here to end it." And again: “Until now, Carthage waged war against Rome; now Rome will lead her against Carthage."
The popular assemblies agreed with his every word, and Scipio was to solemnly assume the office of consul in the coming year. With his arrival, the Amiliev-Scipio group gained dominant influence. Claudius Nero, who won a victory at Metaurus, went into the shadows with the defeat of the Claudian group. Licinius Crassus, an inconspicuous person who held the old post of head of the pontiffs, became second consul. Since tradition forbade the senior pontiff from leaving Italy, Licinius was assigned to lead the command of the troops fighting Hannibal in Bruttia. Sicily was the bridge leading to Africa.
As consul, Scipio had the rank he needed, but he did not have the power to withdraw from Sicily. His proposal to lead an army here and lead it from here to Carthage met with a severe rebuff.
Behind the opposition was an unshakable old concept: the agrarian position of a group of landowners ("Agriculture and Italy"), which craved only the return and colonization of Cisalpine Gaul (where the Carthaginian Mago stood at the head of the Ligurians and Gauls). Far more formidable was the ancient tradition that the republic expanded only in land borders by the combined efforts of national legions and allies. Hannibal thwarted this traditional line of defense for thirteen years.
The eccentric Scipio brought to life a completely new idea of the role of the individual in history, of a real emperor who led the Romans out to sea, into the rich, commercial and dangerous outer Hellenistic world.
Perhaps only Scipio clearly saw where the policy of the old leaders was leading the Roman state. Satisfied with victories in Spain and at Metaurus, they allowed Hannibal to hold his position in Italy. Subconsciously, they believed that it was impossible to force him to leave. They only thought about how to defend themselves against him. And Carthage remained untouched. Another year, two or five years, and they will inevitably begin peace negotiations, after which their great adversary will sail back with his undefeated army to a city that has not suffered any damage in about twenty years of conflict, except for the loss of part of its treasures.
On the steps of the temple of Jupiter, Scipio repeated the rumors that had reached him:
“Hannibal spends his leisure time in the temple of Juno Lacinia on the south bank. He ordered a bronze plate to be cast, on which descriptions of his victories would be engraved. - And Scipio listed them: - At Ticino, at Trebbia, at Lake Trasimene, at Cannae. I will be surprised if he does not add at the end: victory over the Roman people.
In order to gain the Senate's consent to his plan of march from Sicily, Scipio threatened to carry it out before the popular assemblies, which supported any of his attempts to end the conflict. This was tantamount to disobeying the will of the elders and set the leaders of the Senate against this warrior from Spain. Violent debates began. Fabius Maxim opposed the African expedition, which meant - against Scipio.
The delayer spoke with the tricks of a seasoned orator and with the repressed hostility of a very old man for a youth who had achieved the same fame as himself. Why, he asked the senators, should he challenge a man younger than his own son?
He paid tribute to Scipio, "with every day the growing glory of our very brave consul." He vigorously tried to belittle his own fame and appealed to younger senators.
"I kept Hannibal from conquering so that you people, whose strength is constantly growing, could defeat him."
And suddenly he reproached them in the face. Why, he asked, while Hannibal was there, one might say, at their door, should they go to Africa in the hope that he would follow them? Let them first make peace in Italy before taking the war to Africa.
“Tell me, God forbid this should happen! - what if the victorious Hannibal opposes our city, because what has already happened can happen again, will we not have to recall our consul from Africa, as we recalled Fulvius from Capua?
He made it possible for the listeners to feel how dangerous the African coast was, and to remember the fate of another consul, Regulus, who invaded there. He grossly downplayed Scipio's achievements in Spain. What did Publius Cornelius do there that was so significant? Did he travel safely along the friendly coast to take command of the army that was already there and trained by his late father? Yes, he took New Carthage - when none of the three Carthaginian armies were there. What, then, is Scipio counting on, jeopardizing the fate of Rome with his campaign in Africa, when not a single port and not a single friendly army is waiting for him there? An alliance with the Numidians, with Syphax? In Spain, his Celtiberian allies opposed him, and his own warriors rebelled. On the other hand, at Metaurus, the two consuls joined forces to prove that any alien could be defeated in Italy. And - "where Hannibal is, there is the center of this war."
Fabius asked the senate to consider whether Scipio was acting for the sake of the state or in the name of his own ambitions. He had already jeopardized the fate of Rome when he crossed on two ships without the permission of the Senate to the African coast, although he was then a Roman general.
“In my opinion,” he concluded, “Publius Cornelius was chosen consul for the sake of the republic, and not for his own sake. Our armies are recruited in order to defend the city and Italy, and not so that the consuls, like autocratic tyrants, can transfer troops wherever they please.
It was a strong performance by Fabius, a man of great authority. Scipio stood with an expression of obvious disdain for the senate on his face. He made no attempt to counter the accusations. He replied that he was satisfied with their intention to form their own opinion about his life and actions, and would agree with this opinion. As for his plan, can't they make a stronger argument than Hannibal himself? Hannibal had nothing to fear when he invaded Italy, although he met with the Roman people's army. Nothing like this existed in Africa.
Ironically, the debate in the Senate turned into a debate about Hannibal himself and the actions that should have been taken against him. Although Scipio lost in this dispute, he won what he wanted - permission to act as he pleased. The Senate allowed him to cross from Sicily to Africa, "if he thinks it will benefit the state." However, and this is almost unbelievable, he denied Scipio the right to withdraw from Italy legions or more than 30 ships in excess of those needed for Sicily. In addition, he could call on anyone he wanted or build ships - but with his own money.
What followed was entirely the initiative of one man, Scipio, driven by personal ambition. In the beginning, everything was done with his money and at his own risk.
The two regular legions that awaited him in Sicily consisted of long-forgotten soldiers from Cannes who were serving their exile.
Two hills in Locri
These legions, the fifth and sixth, were "tired of growing old in exile." For them, the arrival of Scipio was like an unexpected appearance of a god. He returned them to active actions, but what actions! Land in Africa to claim the riches of Carthage and achieve ultimate victory! From that moment on, forgotten from the time of Cannes, the legionnaires, already aged, responded to Scipio with canine devotion.
The young consul brought with him from Italy about 7,000 volunteers who preferred to serve him in the untouched expanses of Africa, and not on the battlefields that had seen Hannibal, where an epidemic raged in the camps of the regular army. All of these volunteers already had service experience and were picky in relation to military leaders. In addition, Scipio doubled their salary. Despite his courtesy, this commander from Spain recruited people with discrimination. When noble enthusiasts from Syracuse (the base of his operation) united in a volunteer corps, in armor, on horseback and in resplendent decoration, he kindly told them about the cruelties of war and generously promised to free them from these hardships if they donated their equipment to experienced warriors.
At the same time, Scipio was trying to establish friendly relations with Syracuse, who were still licking their wounds after the bloody purge arranged by Marcellus. Most Greek homeowners filed claims for damages caused by Roman soldiers. The young champion of the new order listened to their complaints and promised compensation.
His quaestor, appointed by the senate, was a clumsy, red-haired plebeian, Marcus Porcius Cato. This Cato (who was forever famous for the phrase "Carthage must be destroyed") was distinguished by rural puritanism and keenly felt where the wind of politics was blowing. Above all, he was the henchman of the aged Fabius. When he protested his boss's careless attitude towards money, Scipio said that he was responsible for the security of the state, and not for how much money would be spent. The enmity between the future censor and the energetic leader lasted a long time.
While Scipio was training his rudimentary army (more than 12,000 but less than 20,000 men) on rough terrain, he thought about how to help it. He sent a call to former military leaders with experience in engineering, with the greed of a curmudgeon he assembled transport ships. From his experience in Spain, he knew that the Romans had two advantages over the Carthaginians: their brilliant siege skills and their naval power. These two advantages he had to use against Hannibal. If his fleet is stronger, then the Sicilian base will become deadly for Carthage; if weaker, it will bring disaster.
Among the Latin chronicles, a myth arose that at that moment all the allied cities of Italy, especially the Etruscan community, opened their shops with shipbuilding materials for Scipio, despite the opposition of the Senate. And that within 45 days, 30 brand new ships were built and launched to the general acclaim. These 30 galleys were equipped with propellers, with which the Romans mastered the art of navigation in time immemorial. It was a great story, but such mechanisms never existed. In 204 BC. e. the Etruscan cities were branded with shame for their recent rebellion, and with the appearance of Mago, they will rise again in revolt. Everywhere the allied cities declared indignantly that they were unable to pay their annual share, "despite the wrath of the Romans." The Senate refused to hear their dignitaries until the deliveries were made. In fact, Scipio brought 30 ships from Italy and managed to find the same number off the coast of Sicily. Not having a stronger battle fleet than this, he decided to prepare the expedition for the campaign.
This myth, in turn, has led some modern historians to present the matter as if Scipio prepared his expedition without any help from an ungrateful Rome. This is also not true. In fact, credit goes to Scipio, the Roman Senate, and incidentally, Hannibal. The disagreement between Scipio and his government was in their ideological disputes. The majority in the senate was right, believing that Scipio, with the larger army of the other consul, could wear Hannibal out with years of war of attrition. Scipio was well aware of this. But he was able to foresee what would follow in the end: an exhausted Italy, freed from Hannibal, would never want to enter a new conflict and invade Africa. (And Scipio's fame would be correspondingly less.) The Senate did little to help him at first, because he had nothing to help him with. The threat of Hannibal's breakthrough to Rome was real if superior military forces did not block it. It was a great skill (which is rarely recognized) on the part of the one-eyed Carthaginian for three years to hold a significant Roman force against his hills. Scipio's plan to rush to the sea with his small army, despite the fact that everything was against him, required great composure on his part.
To cheer up his recruits and gather information, Scipio first sent his assistant Lelius to the sea. With a strong enough detachment, Lelius crossed the sea and reached the port, which the Romans called Hippo of the Kings (now Bona), west of Carthage. Here he landed to plunder the countryside and meet with Masinissa, who arrived with only a few horsemen, although Hippo was within his ancestral domain. What Masinissa said was not encouraging at all. Syphax went over to the side of the Carthaginians.
Why does the consul Scipio hesitate? asked Masinissa. - Tell him to come soon.
The young Numidian warned Lelius that the Carthaginian fleet had gone to sea in search of him. And the Roman raiders immediately went to Sicily.
Scipio took much of the booty they brought, but the idea of the sea quickly faded. Carthage, alarmed by the raid of Lelia, gathered all its forces to repulse. Guard posts and signal beacons were established on the capes along the African coast. A fortress wall was erected in the city, recruitment into the army and collection of money were made, at the same time shipyards in the inner harbors were feverishly earned.
The results were not long in coming. The fleet that Lelius had overlooked went out to sea again, with chests of treasure, with reinforcements of 6,000 men, with 800 Numidians, their horses, and 7 elephants. He eluded the Roman guard ships, as did Mago's fleet, and came to Genoa with orders for Mago to take the lead of the Ligurians and Gauls and try to link up with Hannibal. To help Hannibal himself, a convoy of 100 ships, unaccompanied, but with people, a cargo of grain and silver, went straight to Locri in Bruttium. An unforeseen circumstance upset these plans. A storm scattered the convoy, and 20 transport ships were sunk by Roman galleys. Some of the surviving ships returned safely to Carthage, but not a single ship made it to the coast where Hannibal was.
It became obvious that the half-disbanded Roman fleet was inactive: once vigilant, in the days of Otacilius, the ships no longer plied the sea. With growing anxiety, Scipio heard that Hannibal had left his land lines and was moving towards Locri.
On the first galleys that turned up, Scipio loaded all the forces at hand, with ladders and mechanisms, and headed for Locri. They were a short distance from the coast of Sicily, but outside the zone of his authority. Scipio ignored this circumstance in the heat of impatience to get ahead of the Cannes magician. Despite his haste, he made sure to bring ships and equipment with him.
Locri was the larger of the two ports left to Hannibal in Bruttia. A small Roman detachment, as always, by cunning, had already entered it: a group of artisans from Locri were allowed to return home from the Sicilian captivity on the condition that they let the Roman detachment outside the city wall. The city was located between two hills protected by fortresses, and the Roman detachment penetrated only into the southern citadel. A certain Pleminius, one of Scipio's generals, commanded here. The Carthaginian garrison was driven to the opposite hill.
Hannibal, rapidly approaching from the north, gave orders to his garrison to set out on the night he approached to attack the Roman-occupied citadel. The townspeople, who considered the Roman soldiers to be liberators, took water in their mouths and took refuge in their homes.
On this day Scipio's galley entered the harbor, and his cohorts filled the streets between the hills. His scouts went out to the northern road and saw the approaching horsemen of the Carthaginian. In the evening, Hannibal's advance detachment approached the city wall. Scipio's cohorts hurried out the gates to form battle formation. When Hannibal arrived, he found an enemy fleet in the harbor and a strong army in the city. His troops did not take with them any assault ladders or catapults. After taking his garrison from the citadel, Hannibal left.
This bloodless clash of armed forces was almost an accident. Most likely, Hannibal only later learned about the presence of Scipio. Nevertheless, this instilled courage in the legionnaires of Scipio, who met with the invincible Carthaginian and saw his retreat.
Departure for Africa
Locri had such consequences that almost spoiled the whole thing for Scipio. His legate, Pleminius, showed himself to be a notorious beast when he was placed in command of the captured port. In his sadistic revelry, he executed the leaders of Locri who collaborated with the Carthaginians, sent young women to brothels, removed treasures from the city's temple, and finally lashed two tribunes of the Roman army. The inhabitants of Locri, who regretted the change of masters, sent their messengers with a complaint to Rome.
Scipio could be cruel in his pursuit of his goal: for example, he sentenced the leaders of the rebellion in Spain to public torture, and his legionaries rattled their swords in approval, but he was not as ferocious as Marcellus. For reasons known only to him, Scipio supported Pleminius. The Senate investigated both this case and Scipio's act. The flogging of the tribunes, who had immunity under Roman law, was an insult, and the desecration of a temple was an insult to the gods. Moreover, the Roman consul in Sicily again endangered his life outside the zone of his legitimate authority. To these considerations, the Senate added a secret report by Quaestor Cato on Scipio's behavior in Syracuse. The report accused the consul of behavior contrary to the interests of Rome.
Scipio seems to have relaxed in the evening, talking with the Greeks over a cup of wine. A military leader, he walked around in sandals and a light Greek tunic and attended sports games in the gym. Ironically, the new debate over Scipio ended with the sending of representatives of the Senate to investigate in Sicily, with the power to depose him. Scipio prepared for the reception of the inspectors by arranging a dress rehearsal for the invasion. Near the shore, the senators kept galleys ready for battle. In the harbor, several hundred confiscated transports lay dead at anchor. The arsenals contained mountains of grain and weapons. Ballistas and catapults, mostly captured in Syracuse, were waiting at the piers at the ready. Most importantly, new legions were marching back and forth on the parade ground, coordinated like machines.
The senators had enough experience to appreciate the high level when it took place. Satisfied with the appearance of this new army, which cost almost nothing to the treasury, they returned to Rome to extol Publius Cornelius Scipio as a worthy son of his father, a brave warrior, adherent of ancient traditions.
This was the beginning of goodwill towards Scipio from the Senate, and after that Scipio began to enjoy his fullest support. Following a magnificent invasion parade, Scipio demanded that a real invasion begin. When his warriors boarded the ships, he suffered a crushing blow, which he hid. Messengers arrived from Syphax and reported that the leader of the Numidians believed that he should be devoted to Carthage. A personal letter warned Scipio against conducting a campaign in which Syphax would act as his opponent. "Don't land in Africa."
Scipio did not publish this warning. To explain the appearance of the Numidians in the location of his camp, he said that their king, Masinissa, asked him to hurry. Then Scipio ordered everyone to board the ships.
At dawn, Scipio boarded the flagship, which, along with the battle galleys, was waiting, ready to escort a convoy of 400 different ships and about 30,000 soldiers, including crews of warships. On deck, he slaughtered a sacrificial sheep with his own hands and threw its entrails into the sea. Witnesses said that he called on the power of Neptune to help the Roman ships.
Scipio prayed: "Give me the strength to try my luck against the Carthaginians."
Trumpets blew, and Scipio called on pilots to guide ships to the coast of Sirte, east of Syracuse. When the last ship of the convoy was out of earshot of the crowd gathered on the shore, he changed the order. The pilots were supposed to lead the ships directly to Carthage.
Two weeks passed before a galley arrived from Africa with the first report of the expedition. It was announced to the waiting crowd in Syracuse: "Victorious landing, the city is captured with one blow, along with eight thousand prisoners and huge booty." As evidence, prisoners and boxes of valuables were presented on board the galley.
Things, however, were not going well.
The Blackest Hour of Scipio
Africa has awakened from its hibernation of peacetime to resist the invader. Poets have always considered a woman a symbol of Africa. According to legend, Dido was the queen of Carthage, conquered and then abandoned by Aeneas, the alleged "ancestor" of the Romans. Carthage itself, according to legend, was founded by the runaway daughter of the Tyrian king. Her name was derived from the deified name Tinnit (Great Mother), the temple in whose honor crowned the hill of Birsa. It symbolized the struggle of Africa against Europe, the achievements ancient culture against barbarism. Regulus, the invader, himself believed that he would become the conqueror of the African coast, but was thrown back into the sea.
Elusive forces unexpectedly set out to confront Scipio, also a Roman consul, after his daring and successful crossing in the middle of the summer of 204 BC. e. He landed on the coast near Utica. This seaside city, which was older than Carthage (the Romans called it Utica), aroused, like the maritime empire of Carthage, the envy of Marcellus and, moreover, occupied an important strategic position, since it was near the mouth of the Bagrad River, closer than 20 miles from its younger sisters, Birsas. He counted on the fact that he could conquer or attack Utika with lightning speed. By doing so, he could have a fortified base open to the sea, a day's march from the protective earthworks of Carthage. Unexpectedly, this Phoenician-Greek city resisted and repulsed the attack. Scipio had to lead a siege in a hostile country.
The coast itself turned out to be hostile. Scipio counted on the fact that he would raise the interior lands - tens of thousands of Numidians subordinate to Syphax - against the Carthaginians. However, Syphax, as he had warned Scipio, mobilized his military resources to help Hasdrubal, the son of Gisgon, who had few people. And to some extent, the woman was to blame. It was Sophonisba, the daughter of the cunning Hasdrubal. Sophonisba, a young beauty, took lessons in music and seduction from Greek teachers. She was devoted to her father and Carthage. Hasdrubal sealed his agreement with the old Numidian by giving him Sophonisba as his wife, so that she would report on what he was doing and influence him. She did a great job with both.
Masinissa also played his part when he appeared on the siege line. Scipio thought he could make use of some of the exiled chieftain's Numidian horsemen. There were only two hundred of them. Masinissa had no visible resources other than hand weapons and inexhaustible fortitude. He laughingly said that he would have been overtaken and killed if he had not spread rumors about his death.
A certain woman, a mysterious old tribal leader, a nocturnal bandit, and a silent, hostile coast with little to no harbors all together created problems for Publius Cornelius that could not be simply solved by the force of arms of his legionnaires. Winter came, and Utica still resisted him, while the Carthaginian-Numidian army was mobilizing on the plain. Scipio replenished his supplies a little, devastating the fertile basin of Bagrada, in addition, ships brought some grain from Sardinia. He moved his camp to a rocky promontory east of Utica. Here he brought his galleys close to the shore and sent teams to deal with the siege, which had to be completed. He named his camp "Castra Cornelia". As he prepared the camp for defense against Syphax and Hasdrubal ap Gisgon, he sent optimistic reports to the senate (in front of a skeptical Cato), knowing that he might be recalled at the first news of defeat.
Winter storms interrupted its active connection with the northern shores. They also gave him a break from the attacks of the growing Carthaginian fleet. Of all the dangers on the African coast, this was the greatest.
Incredibly, the winter of 204/203 B.C. e. found the two masters of war, Hannibal and Scipio, on a promontory and a peninsula, both on the enemy's coast. For several months, both almost did not take part in the events. At the same time, Hannibal, since Scipio had only limited communication with his senate, may have imagined the picture at sea more clearly.
Exhausted but stubborn, Rome held firm at sea with her 20 legions and 160 warships, not counting the African expedition. From Gades on the ocean shore to the coast of Dalmatia, the legions were encamped, and in their iron grip were the islands, from the Balearics to Sicily, which were now in the maelstrom of war.
In Spain, across the Ebro River, the last center of resistance was dying. Magon could not advance further than the Po River. For the first time, Rome firmly held a foothold on the African coast. The city of Carthage was still safe on a fortified promontory. But the Romans were now masters of the maritime empire, which was what the Barcides were striving for. Hannibal's concern now was Carthage itself.
He reluctantly succumbed to the pressure of two Roman armies, defending the gorges and roads leading through the valleys in order to gain valuable time. Now his enemies threatened Consentia, the largest trading city of Bruttia, while Hannibal held on to Croton, the last port of escape.
The irony of the situation did not fail to hurt him painfully. On a cape near Croton stood the temple of Juno Lacinia - an ancient Greek shrine that Hannibal had to keep at all costs. This temple served as his vantage point and was a quiet place for reflection - a kind of Tifata on the sea. Here, at the entrance to the sanctuary, he placed his memorial bronze plaque. By this time, the Carthaginian commander had seen and read countless Latin plaques testifying to the distinctions, titles and victories won by the Roman patricians. He studied their laws carved in stone. Now he has erected his own memorial, a list of his victories in fifteen years in Italy.
It was the farewell gesture of a man who never aspired to war. Hannibal has not lost his sense of humor.
Solution in the Great Plains
When spring came, Scipio left the Castra Cornelia camp. He did this while the season of storms was still in progress, and before the Carthaginian fleet could put to sea.
During the winter months, his small cavalry outwitted and scattered the large voluntary army of horsemen from Carthage - it was Masinissa's horsemen who lured the zealous Carthaginians to where, hiding in the bushes, the well-trained Roman cavalry was waiting. After such success, Scipio's cavalry began to grow.
Scipio himself, during the winter, negotiated peace with both Syphax and Hasdrubal, whose camps bordered his cape. Scipio was mindful of Syphax's desire to end the war during their meeting. During long arguments, the emissaries discussed this question: maybe withdraw all the armies and restore the status quo? Scipio did not say yes or no, while his generals, who were present at the negotiations under the guise of servants, carefully assessed the situation, the readiness and power of the two hostile camps: Hasdrubal's Carthaginians set up their winter quarters away from the Numidian tents. In the end, Scipio reluctantly admitted that he did not have such authority to guarantee Syphax what he wanted.
While the old Numidian was considering the apparent reluctance of the Romans, and while an unofficial truce existed, fires broke out in both camps one night, and as the Carthaginians and Numidians jumped up to put out the flames, they stumbled upon the swords of Scipio's legionaries. The riders of Masinissa broke into the deserted camps, and Hasdrubal and Syphax barely had time to wake up and carry their feet. The Romans got a lot of booty, warehouses and horses after the fire.
By hook or by crook, Scipio and Lelius led the Africans away from the siege line of the Castra Cornelia camp.
Following this, Scipio ruthlessly and without any delay took advantage of his advantage as an experienced commander and the discipline of his army. The fire in the camps forced the Carthaginians to return to their city, and the Numidians to go to Cyrtha, the stronghold of Syphax to the west. Three weeks passed before the leaders reinforced and regrouped their supporters in the lands that bear the name of the Great Plains. The Carthaginian wife of Syphax insisted on his energetic actions. Help came unexpectedly to him. 4,000 Celtiberians arrived from the west coast. They were veterans with extensive military experience. How and why they came to Carthage has never been clarified. Apparently, they crossed over to Africa to enter the service, which ended in Spain.
At first, everything in Africa turned out quite well for the Celtiberians. With unexpected courage, Scipio led his two best legions, with the growing strength of the cavalry, Numidian and Roman, from the line of defense. After five days of forced march, almost light, he reached the mobilization center of the Carthaginians and Numidians on the Great Plains.
The ensuing battle, in which some 16,000 Romans opposed an allied army of twenty thousand, was disastrous for Carthage. Lelius and Masinissa attacked the flanks of the Carthaginians. The advanced legions of Scipio struck from the front. The Carthaginian center, the core of which was the Celtiberians, was surrounded by fast cavalry and converging ranks of heavily armed infantry. The Celtiberians made no effort to escape. Being Spaniards from the new Roman province of Spain, they knew that they would pay with their lives, and they preferred to die with weapons in their hands. It is known that the legionnaires took considerable effort to put an end to them.
Scipio took advantage of another advantage over his enemies. He had two excellent generals, Laelius and Masinissa. He released Masinissa on a wild pursuit of the fugitives into Numidia, to the west, and sent Lelias behind him with vigorously marching cohorts to support and watch over Masinissa. Leaving the line of defense at Utica to take care of itself, Scipio struck at Tunis, located by a large lagoon opposite Carthage. Tunis was notorious for little other than its quarries and merchants, but its lagoon served as a safe harbor for the Carthaginian fleet.
Scipio saw in Tunisia what he feared most of all - the enemy fleet was leaving its parking lot. Without losing a moment, he rushed on horseback, accompanied by a small detachment (the legions followed him) to the camp of Castra Cornelia. Here the Roman galleys were equipped with siege engines and sent to bombard Utica, while the transport ships, without any protection, anchored. Scipio galloped back to his camp. There he himself, the crews of the ships and all the soldiers at hand immediately turned into engineers. Since Scipio's few battle galleys were in no condition to go to sea, they were used as barriers. Probably no one but the Romans thought of building a protective wall of sailboats, and only the warriors from the seven hills managed to figure out how to do it. They lined up heavy transport ships bow to stern, in several rows towards the galleys, removed masts and crossbars to tie the ships together, and threw boarding bridges from the galleys to the outer row of ships. Then the legionnaires armed themselves and prepared vehicles to defend their unique wall of ships.
The Carthaginian flagship made the mistake of being on the high seas waiting for its enemies to leave the harbor, which, of course, did not happen. When the Carthaginian galleys moved the next day to the coast of Utica, they found a wall of transport ships manned by warriors and lost even more time, puzzled by this new tactic. The Carthaginians, however, were as skilled seafarers as the Romans were skilled craftsmen. The conflict at Utica ended with the Carthaginians victoriously towing about 60 Roman sailing ships. And Scipio was supposed to guard the Castra Cornelia camp for some time.
Meanwhile, Masinissa raced across his Massalian ancestral land to break the resistance built up around his enemy Syphax, depose Syphax himself, and chain the wounded chieftain to demonstrate him in the countryside. Where the opposition was strong, Lelius intervened with his heavily armed infantry and defeated them. But this was the land of Masinissa's ancestors. The townspeople had no leader left when Syphax was in chains, and the Bedouins only wanted to follow the winners.
Kirta fell, and at the entrance to the palace Masinissa saw Sophonisba waiting for him. Legend has it that she begged a young Numidian to keep her, a Carthaginian, from falling into the hands of the Romans. Poets claim that Masinissa was crazy about her. And probably Masinissa secured his victory over the wounded Syphax by taking his young wife. Lelius, who had come to establish law and order in this disorganized conquered land, protested, saying that Sophonisba was an agent of the Carthaginians, and now she was a prisoner of the senate and the Roman people. Masinissa, feeling his strength returning to him, did not listen to him. Nevertheless, Lelius forced him to turn to Scipio for a solution to this issue.
The three men returned to the frontiers of Utica, where Scipio decided that the wounded Syphax should be sent as a captive leader to Rome. Both must have remembered their meeting when Syphax's hospitality protected the young proconsul. The myth that surrounded Sophonisba said that Syphax accused her of having deceitfully destroyed his friendship with Scipio and that he had warned the Roman general that she would do the same to Masinissa. It is highly doubtful that a Numidian, who was endowed with lifelong power, would have blamed a woman for his downfall. Most likely, the cautious Scipio did not want a Carthaginian to become Masinissa's wife, especially one like Sofonisba. Scipio was in urgent need of Numidian cavalry.
The two of them discussed it, and Masinissa left the Roman's tent to meditate alone at night. He too needed his ally, because without the Roman legions, Masinissa could not resist the power of Carthage.
And the legend ends the story of this woman with a scene like from a Greek tragedy, which Livy described with taste. Masinissa allegedly sent one of his Numidians back to the palace in Cirta with poison in a bowl and demanded that Sophonisba make a choice: die or go as a prisoner with Syphax to Rome. Whereupon she told the messenger, "I did not expect such a wedding gift from my husband." And drank poison.
Whatever it was, but the Carthaginian was killed. The old Numidian, chained, was taken to Rome along with other evidence of Scipio's victory. The hostile coast was conquered. As a reward, Masinissa received royal gifts from Scipio, who after that addressed him as a king. He was granted a golden crown, a luxuriously embroidered robe and a high state post in the curia. He was crowned before the formation of the legions. He became the first of the Eastern monarchs to become known as a protege of Rome.
However, the story of Sophonisba's death survived the glory of Masinissa.
Carthage urges its sons to return home
After the disaster on the Great Plains, Carthage felt in danger. Up to this time, as is often the case, irreconcilable differences existed in the council of Birsa. A strong peace party bewailed the failure of the Barkids and demanded reconciliation with Rome, another group insisted on the return of Hannibal, a third urged the need to make more efforts to expel Scipio from the positions he had won, where he conducted unofficial preliminary negotiations during the winter. In the crowded streets near Byrsa, merchant guilds, craftsmen and ordinary citizens loudly demanded Hannibal. The Suffet did not know what decision to make.
Between mid-March and the end of June, Roman legions poured onto the roads in the hinterland, and one Carthaginian field army disappeared into the Great Plains. From the Gulf of Sirte to the border of Numidia, the city was cut off from the continent. Refugees rushed to the city with their belongings, but without food. The crops on the banks of the vital Bagrada River were at the disposal of the enemy. The crowded streets smelled of hunger. All plans have changed.
Three walls now protected the city at the tip of the promontory; the garrisons took up positions within them; the fleet guarded the entrance to the harbor. But the city could not endure many months without food brought in from the hinterland. The garrison was not prepared to face an army like Scipio's on the battlefield. Deprived of Numidian recruits, the city did not have sufficient numbers to form a new army, and had, moreover, no one who would be able to lead it against Scipio. Hasdrubal, father of Sophonisba, committed suicide.
The council placed Hanno, a veteran of Hannibal's campaign who had been commander of the heavily armed cavalry at Cannae, in command of the defense. In addition, the council sent messengers to Magon, to the Alps, and to Hannibal, demanding that they return with their armies to Africa. The council then replaced the commander of the fleet, the overcautious Bomilcar, with a more suitable one also called Hasdrubal. Under the command of a new commander, the fleet launched a sortie against Utica and returned, capturing 60 Roman transport ships. These sailing ships, re-armed, were the perfect addition to the large convoy that was needed to bring Hannibal home across a sea swarming with enemy ships.
On the Ligurian coast, the faithful Magon had his own fleet and was also very skilled in naval maneuvers. Hannibal had several ships in the small harbor of Croton. However, his foot during the life of a whole generation no longer set foot on board the ship. And Carthage demanded Hannibal. The impatient crowds at the three gates of Byrsa did not stop shouting his name.
It was already July (203 BC) and the weather was suitable for going to sea.
There is not a word about this crisis in historical sources. Failure. Sudden - as when stopping a film, when they put on the next part. In July, Hannibal waits in the mountains of Bruttia. In early autumn or October, he is already overseas, in Africa, with his army in full gear. "Dunkirk" took place during a period of time for which there is no written record. Latin historiographers chose not to explain how Hannibal got out of Italy.
Modern historians have paid attention to this riddle. One concludes that ships at sea are hard to find. This is true. Even Nelson failed to locate Napoleon's convoy as it sailed across the Mediterranean towards the Nile. However, this does not explain how Hannibal went to sea unnoticed. In close proximity to it were two Roman armies. They were able to defeat his troops during the boarding of ships in order to defeat him for the first time. And of course, his army, when loaded onto transport ships, was spared by the battle fleet, which could end Hannibal once and for all.
Another historian goes further in his explanation: since the Roman Senate was at that time negotiating a truce (as has now become apparent) with the Carthaginian envoys, and since under Roman law it was not necessary to negotiate while the armed forces of the enemy were on Italian soil, the Senate was interested in the departure of Hannibal and Mago from the peninsula. This is hardly possible. Negotiations with Carthage did not extend to Carthaginian troops in Italy. Hannibal did not get a day's respite after crossing the snow-covered pass of the Alps. In any case, the Roman fleet intercepted and captured part of Mago's convoy.
There can be only one simple explanation for this riddle. Hannibal left unnoticed, as he had done before, crossing the Volturno at Capua.
Croton stands in plain sight near a crescent-shaped shallow bay, standing in a place as flat as a table. But behind this small port, as far as the eye can see, are the hills of La Sila. These hills were held by the Carthaginians, while the Romans, who occupied Consentia, occupied the far slopes.
As the day of departure approached - when Hasdrubal, commander of the fleet, arrived with his considerable convoy - Hannibal left the people who were still in his service the choice: follow him or remain in Italy. Most of them decided to accompany him. He did not take with him the weakest group of people, with numerous women and children, which became part of his army in Italy. (The story that he brutally destroyed all those who refused to leave, in the temple of Juno Lacinia, is just bloody tales of the Latins.) Hannibal really demanded that all horses dear to his heart be destroyed, since they could not be taken with him on ships . He also ordered those units that were to remain in Italy to take up Carthaginian posts in the hills while the contingents heading for Africa were loaded onto ships and sailed away. The Roman command did not have information about his departure, and, apparently, a lot of time passed before they were convinced that Hannibal really went to sea.
One of the most incredible facts in the biography of Hannibal is that he arrived in Italy with an army consisting of Spaniards and Africans, and left it mainly with Bruttians, Gauls and numerous Roman deserters. If any elephants survived, they were not taken with them. Hannibal never mentioned the moment when he watched the mountains of Italy and the white dot of the temple of Juno Lacinia disappear into the horizon. (The description of him gnashing his teeth in anger at being called to Carthage, which did not support him in the war, is a reminiscence of the old delusion of those who believed that it was Hannibal who planned the war. Carthage could not force him to return to Africa against his will. He prepared to leave with his usual thoroughness After the Great Plains, the focus of the conflict moved to the African coast, and Hannibal left Italy, like Hamilcar left Mount Eric, without any internal protest.)
The manner in which his departure took place proves that his army heading for Africa could not have been large. Later sources estimated its number from 12,000 to 15,000 people, but most likely this army was even less than 12,000. The convoy consisted only of sailing ships. The galleys, with their small decks and large numbers of oarsmen, could only carry a small number of passengers. Moreover, after autumn equinox it was dangerous for fragile galleys to go on long journeys due to cold winds and storms. And Hannibal and his commander of the fleet made the long journey from Croton.
Now it is quite clear where the Roman fleets were located and what they were doing at that time. From 140 to 160 battle galleys were based in Ostia, Sardinia and Sicily. A significant part of them accompanied new convoys to Africa, since in these months the main thing was to deliver food and reinforcements to Scipio. (“All eyes were fixed on Africa.”) One detachment intercepted ships that fought off Mago's convoy.
Magon himself was wounded in the last battle on the Po when he tried to withdraw his units from the battle or make a last attempt to break through to Hannibal. Mago died en route or was shipwrecked in a storm. Most of his ships, filled with Balearians, Ligurians and Gauls, eventually sailed to Carthage.
The Roman fleets outside of Sicily were stationed between Croton and Carthage. They watched the approach of Hannibal's convoy, but in vain.
Hannibal and his fleet commander made a big circle around Sicily. Perhaps they were spotted from a guard post in Malta. However, by that time the Sicilian fleet had no time to intercept them. They were not heading for Carthage. They approached from the east, landing on the east coast, in what is now Tunisia, more than 80 miles south of the Sacred Mount of Carthage. Once on land in this unforeseen place, Hannibal quickly moved his army north to Hadrumet, a harbor and quite Big city, located outside the zone of Roman patrol.
Thirty-four years later, Hannibal again stood on African soil. Both of his brothers were dead. And all the cares of Rome were concentrated on him, which he led into confusion with his safe movement from continent to continent. “Hope and anxiety increased every day,” says Livy. - People could not decide whether to be glad that after sixteen years Hannibal left Italy, or to be alarmed, because he arrived in Africa with his army unscathed. Quintus Fabius [Slower], who died shortly before, often said that Hannibal would become a more serious rival in his own land than in a foreign state. And Scipio did not want to deal with either Syphax, king in the country of uncouth barbarians, or Hasdrubal, a general who could quickly slip away, or with irregular troops, which were a bunch of villagers. Hannibal was born, one might say, at the headquarters of his father, the most courageous of generals. He left evidence of his great deeds in Spain, and in the land of the Gauls, and in Italy; from the Alps to the Strait of Messina. His army endured inhuman hardships. Many of his warriors, who could resist Scipio in battle, killed the Roman praetors with their own hands and walked around the captured Roman cities and camps. All the Roman magistrates at that time did not have so many attributes of power that they could carry before Hannibal and which were taken from the commanders who fell in battle.
An alarmed senate announced four days of games in the circus ring to appease the gods, while holding a feast in honor of Jupiter in his Capitoline temple.
The outlines of the future
If the senate was in alarm, then Scipio was probably stunned. He expected (and prepared for) the arrival of Hannibal in Africa. However, he could not foresee that "the magician of Cannes" would elude the Roman armies and force his way through the blockade of the flotilla "with his army intact." Just as he could not foresee that another highly experienced Carthaginian army would be transferred with lightning speed from the banks of the Po River to the banks of Bagrada.
That autumn, in the conquered positions of Scipio, Utica continued to show her defiance. He also failed to occupy Bizerte (then Hippo Diarit) on the western shore of the bay. He continued to depend on the port of Castra Cornelia that supplied him. The impregnable Carthage mobilized all its resources. Lelius, Scipio's right-hand man, remained in Rome after bringing Syphax there. The intractable Masinissa was in the west, trying at all costs to replenish the ranks of the cavalry and get all the Massilian lands for himself.
It seemed that all or almost all the evil prophesied by the late Fabius in Africa was beginning to come true. Will Masinissa be able or willing to join Scipio in time? Can enough armed men who were freed in Italy be shipped south to Africa to make up for Hannibal's arrival? Will these forces be sent in time?
Before anything could happen, winter came, ending the main transport links by sea. As in Castra Cornelia a year earlier, Scipio found himself isolated on the edge of the African coast, with the difference that now Hannibal was with him on this edge.
Faced with this crisis, Publius Cornelius Scipio ceased to be merely a brilliant regional commander of Rome and became one of prominent people stories. For his actions, he paid with the political career he so aspired to, and incurred the envy and hatred of a man named Cato. Faced with both great opportunity and great danger, Scipio no longer thought about it.
By good fortune, or by foresight, which brings good luck, Scipio made a truce with the council of Carthage. At the end of the last summer, he needed time to reorganize his troops, while the people from Byrsa needed time to bring Hannibal home after the defeats on the Great Plains. Therefore, it is not surprising that they concluded a truce in Africa (this did not work out in Italy), but it happened in an amazing way. Scipio met with the bearded envoys of the Carthaginian council and, after listening to them, offered his terms for a peace agreement. This was not unusual, and both sides used different tricks, as Scipio had done before setting fire to the Carthaginian camps, to gain time. Nevertheless, Scipio brilliantly came up with the idea of offering genuine conditions as deceitful conditions, with the help of which he wanted to end the war.
These conditions were:
Return to Rome of all prisoners, fugitives and deserters.
The withdrawal of the Carthaginian armies from Italy.
The transfer of Sardinia and Corsica with Sicily by Carthage and the cessation of interference in the affairs of Spain (the former province of Scipio). Reduction of the number of battle galleys to 20. Payment of 5,000 talents of silver as an indemnity (about $4,000,000 in money or bullion, which was of much greater value than it is now).
In addition, issues were discussed regarding the supply of provisions to the Roman armies in Africa during the truce and issues related to the recognition of Masinissa as king in his own country.
Now, given his position (without consulting the senate), Scipio seems to have pondered all the complexities of the years-long conflict. He singled out the realities of the coming years - that Carthage should not be destroyed, and Rome should become the ruler of the seas. Moreover, he realized that it would take generations to bring Spain into any sort of order, which he intended to do. Perhaps he was thinking of his own return to Spain. Certainly he had no intention of demanding the surrender of Hannibal, who might have been harmless in Africa without a battle fleet and without Spain. And then the two continents, separated, could keep the peace.
Knowing the tendency of Carthaginian government officials to argue, Scipio gave them only three days to either confirm the truce and convey its terms to Rome, or not. The council accepted the terms, under the influence of an opposition group to the Barqids and hoping to buy time through negotiations. The appearance of the conditions of Scipio and the envoys of Carthage in Rome naturally aroused the astonishment of the elders in the senate, who could not understand what had come upon their general in the middle of a successful campaign. Like all senators everywhere and at all times, the elders resented terms that were not originally negotiated by them. Speakers made speeches on behalf of different groups: from those who were engaged in transport, from landowners, from the Claudii against the Scipios. This debate became even more heated after the unexpected arrival of robed messengers from Carthage. Some of them, it is true, confirmed that Hannibal was guilty of acts to which they did not consent. The Romans fully agreed with this. But the majority tried to revive the old treaty that linked Carthage with Rome before the war broke out. As if it could be about him now! The Roman senators, who had deep disagreements among themselves, came to complete unity regarding the old treaty. It was no longer to be discussed. They also recognized that they should be given greater guarantees. Some of them may have suspected that the conditions were a ruse, but by whom and for what purpose? As Fabius told them when they voted for hostilities, things are not at all the same in the senate as they are on the battlefield.
Then news came from the battlefields that Hannibal and Mago had disappeared from Italy along with their troops.
This immediately aroused suspicion and the debate began again. Moreover, the senate categorically recalled Lelius, who was on his way to his commander. The question was put before him: what did Publius Cornelius mean by these negotiations. Maybe he wanted Hannibal to stay in Africa, and if so, why?
The tempted Lelius gave a brilliant answer: "Publius Cornelius did not foresee the departure of Hannibal before the signing of peace." And he probably persuaded the bewildered senators to trust their commander and send him reinforcements immediately. Whether the Senate signed the terms of peace or not is a moot point, and it hardly matters. In the end, the senators agreed with Lelius, because they left the decision of this issue to the popular assembly, which demanded the full support of Scipio with all available ships, sacks of grain and armed men in Italy.
But Scipio made new enemies in the Forum. The Claudian faction gained key positions during the new elections after an interim dictator was named to appoint new consuls. Winter storms raged on the sea. Finally, a convoy of 120 transport ships and 20 escort ships left Sardinia under the command of Praetor Lentulus and headed for Castra Cornelia. Another convoy was being prepared under the command of Claudius Nero, who headed for the Metaurus River. But the largest convoy, consisting of 200 ships and 30 galleys, was overtaken off the coast of Sicily by a storm, and most of the cargo ships were washed ashore near Carthage. The Roman galleys managed to save their crews, but the ships, laden with food and fighting mechanisms, swayed in the surf under the two peaks of the Sacred Mountain.
Seeing them was unbearable to the starving population of Carthage, who besieged the doors of the council until ships were sent across the bay, accompanied by war galleys, to seize provisions, as if sent down to them by the invisible Melqart. In fact, all the Carthaginians perked up as soon as they learned about the landing of Hannibal.
At Castra Cornelia, Scipio did his best to extend the cessation of hostilities for at least a few days. (Nero's convoy was on the way.) He showed restraint by sending envoys to Carthage to protest the seizure of the ships and demand the return of the food he needed himself. His ambassadors ran into a noisy demonstration that shouted Hannibal's name. Concerned members of the council secretly sent ambassadors back to their pentekontor, and the Carthaginian battle fleet brought it out of the harbor. After the escort returned, fate intervened again. Three triremes from Hasdrubal's ship formation spotted a Roman ship and, despite the truce, attacked it. The large ship repulsed the attack and escaped by approaching the Roman post.
Scipio behaved as if the truce continued - he sent an urgent recommendation to Rome so that the Carthaginians would be guarded there from the attacks of the mob. With the onset of spring, favorable weather for navigation was just around the corner and the arrival of Nero with a new legion. Masinissa was still far to the west, where he took over all the new cities in the territory of Syphax. Couriers from Cyrtha brought an ominous rumor that the sons of Syphax were gathering cavalry to join Hannibal. Somewhere in the depths of the continent, according to Scipio, the Carthaginian armies united - the remnants of Mago's army with Hanno's recruits from Carthage and Hannibal's veterans.
Undoubtedly, as Scipio concluded, Hannibal would waste no time in forming a new army from these contingents.
One early spring day (the exact date is unknown) Scipio decided not to wait any longer. He had attacked the Carthaginian mobilization center on the Great Plains early the previous year, and seems to have been afraid to give Hannibal more time to organize an army. Whatever his considerations, he withdrew all reliable troops from the lines of Utica and marched up the Bagrada River, moving away from his base and support from the sea. He went without the best part of his cavalry - the Numidians. Every day he sent horse messengers to the west demanding that Masinissa come. He pushed southwest, following the river for as long as he could, burning villages, destroying crops, and driving columns of rope-bound captives from once prosperous Carthaginian lands.
Such devastation caused the inhabitants of the villages along the river to urgently send messengers to Hannibal's winter camp at Hadrumet to ask their patron to protect them quickly.
The Council of Carthage also urged him to oppose Scipio.
Hannibal replied to the envoys:
I know better than you what to do.
But they left him when they learned of Scipio's march and the fact that the Romans did not yet have Numidian cavalry. Apparently, Hannibal was not yet ready to move. However, he immediately did so.
The huge camp was disbanded. Armed men poured out of their huts on the coast. The Ligurians, Gauls, Balearicians, Bruttians and Carthaginians, in long columns, hastily stretched westward, from under the cover of the coastal ridges to the plains. The aging Hanno led his newly recruited cavalry. A detachment of 2000 Numidians followed one of the rulers loyal to Syphax. 80 elephants wandered along the road.
There was not much cargo, so Hannibal moved at high speed to intercept and surprise Scipio before Masinissa joined him. He was accompanied by 37,000 people who had not yet been soldered into the army.
Ironically, Hannibal was approaching a country that he had only seen as a nine-year-old child, while the Romans were moving through territory that was already familiar to them.
Battle of Zama
Let us take a moment to look at these two rivals, for history knows no other such pair of people in opposition to each other. Hannibal is a strategist. He is most dangerous on the field he has chosen, where he immediately uses all the advantages of the terrain. He knows how, like no one else, to direct his best striking forces to a weak area at the disposal of the enemy. It's impossible to foresee where this might happen if Hannibal has the ability to choose the battlefield. So far, the crushing blow has usually come from his Spanish-African cavalry, but they are no longer with him.
Scipio, too, is meticulous in his preparation, though he is daring in his actions. He relies on one tactic, attacking in converging lines of formation of his legions, which he moves with amazing skill when the battle begins. He has complete confidence in his disciplined legionnaires, and they in him. He may or may not have stronger cavalry than his enemy.
Both, Hannibal and Scipio, understand, unlike most other commanders, that the war has only one goal - the establishment of true peace.
The southern plain was still green after the winter rains. Scipio probably received the first warning of Hannibal's approach from Carthaginian spies. They were caught in the territory of the Roman camp near the village of Naraggara. It is said that after interrogating the disguised Carthaginians, Scipio had them led through the entire camp so that they could see whatever they wanted, or whatever he wanted them to see. Then, unexpectedly, he released them so that they returned to the Carthaginian camp, located near the village of Zama.
Upon learning that Hannibal had been seen on the march, Scipio led his columns east. He walked towards his enemy until he crossed a small stream, not yet dry from the summer heat. (The exact location was never named.) Here, to his surprise, he met Hannibal's messenger, who said that Hannibal wanted to negotiate a truce with him personally.
Now Scipio did not know where the Carthaginian army was waiting. He decided that, apparently, Hannibal no longer hoped to surprise his column, which was on the march, as it had been at Lake Trasimene. His Romans, however, were six days' march from their base. There were no hills to be seen anywhere to hide behind. Without the support of strong cavalry, his legions could have a hard time on the plains to which he led them.
While Scipio was thinking, he noticed a breathtaking sight. From the west, on horseback, Masinissa was approaching, flashing with new insignia, and behind him a cloud of horsemen that occupied the whole plain. There were 6,000 of them, and 4,000 infantrymen followed them, which no longer had of great importance. Scipio, with difficulty, but managed to connect with Masinissa before his meeting with Hannibal takes place. Now he had stronger cavalry than his enemy.
As a result, he released the Carthaginian messenger, answering that he would meet with Hannibal.
The camp could safely be left under the supervision of Lelia and Masinissa.
Their meeting was described by Polybius, who, two generations later, served the family of Scipio. From the Carthaginian camp, which was in a lowland on the other side of the valley, Hannibal rode out on horseback, accompanied by a horse escort. Leaving the escort behind, he dismounted and approached, accompanied by an interpreter. Scipio, for his part, did the same, also taking an interpreter. Although they both spoke Greek fluently, and Hannibal understood Latin, they took advantage of the opportunity to have time to think while the interpreters repeated their words, and, in addition, enlisted witnesses just in case.
They met in silence. Hannibal was older and taller. His wrinkled, tanned face was wrapped in a headscarf that covered his graying hair. He turned his head slightly so that he could see with his good eye. Scipio stood bareheaded, holding his helmet in his hand. He was restrainedly tense. His handsome face showed nothing. Other than a cross on his helmet and gold inlay on his cuirasses, he wore no insignia and was not accompanied by lictors.
After a long pause, Hannibal spoke and waited for the translation.
You have made progress, Roman Consul. In addition, fortune smiled at you.
Scipio waited.
Did you really think, continued Hannibal, that Rome could achieve something through war? That is, more than what you have at the moment? Did you think that if you were defeated here, you would lose your army? He thought for a moment. “I wouldn't propose to make peace if I didn't think it would benefit both of us.
Scipio waited. It was obvious that Hannibal had heard about the conditions for the cessation of hostilities. When Scipio spoke, he asked what terms Hannibal disagreed with in Rome.
Hannibal replied that he did not agree that all the islands, including the smallest ones located between Italy and Africa (such as the group of Maltese islands) and Spain, should be abandoned by Carthage. He did not mention surrendering warships, but he would not have given up runaway slaves or deserters in the Carthaginian army. (According to Roman law, this would include most of his Italian veterans.)
In response, Scipio explained that he could not cede to Carthage more than what his government had agreed to by signing the terms in Rome. (Signed or not, these were the terms proposed by Scipio.)
At this they both greeted each other and parted. No agreement was possible between them until Hannibal offered more than the terms of surrender offered by Scipio. Instead, he offered less. It depended equally on them only whether an attempt was made to destroy each other's armed forces.
That night Scipio seemed to be in high spirits. At a last-minute conference of generals, all he had to do was warn the alarmed Masinissa about the mission of the Numidian cavalry, which was to act as a single unit on one flank. This in itself made Scipio's task easier, for all the other cavalry were now handed over to Lelius at the opposite end of the Roman line. Scipio thought about the number of elephants seen in the Carthaginian camp. In every other respect his plans were well thought out. Legion commanders knew about them. Scipio addressed the commanders:
Tell the people that their hardships will soon be over. The day after tomorrow they will receive African trophies. After that, they will be able to go home, each to their own city.
In the Carthaginian camp, Hannibal is said to have gone from squad to squad, conversing with people he knew from Italy and with newcomers from Carthage. He calmly instructed the military leaders. Perhaps only Gannon, a veteran of the Alpine campaign, clearly understood what these instructions meant. Others were content to obey strictly, trusting Hannibal's vast experience. He told them that for sixteen years his Carthaginians had outnumbered the armed Romans and that there were no barriers, no hidden obstacles in this valley of Zama that they could not overcome.
The people there did not have the time to build defensive walls and could not bring their fighting mechanisms. Has anyone seen catapults among their silver eagles?
He seemed cheerful, and this gave hope to his generals.
Hannibal did not sleep that night, because the first stage of his attack began in the last hours of the night. There was almost no water in the camp, as the nearest river flowed across the plain behind the Roman positions. If this had been his old "Italian" army, Hannibal could have withdrawn it discreetly under the cover of darkness. He could neither retreat across the open plain with his motley army, which was opposed by the Numidian forces, nor try to hold this position in the absence of a constant supply of water. It took a while to get so many elephants moving at such an early hour when there was barely light on the horizon. The elephants didn't want to move in the dark. From his vantage point on the hill, Hannibal watched them go. Behind them came Magon's men, silent Ligurians and grumbling Gauls, and in addition wild Moroccans and a few Spaniards. Hannibal supplied these lighter units with heavy weapons and taught them to move as they were now, shoulder to shoulder. They were skilled fighters.
Only the messengers, who were with Hannibal on the hill, saw what was happening in this twilight. His troops did not form the usual long battle formation. The three elements - the troops of Mago, the Carthaginian recruits and the veterans of Hannibal - advanced separately, in three waves. In this way, three small armies could operate separately under the command of their generals. And in front of all were powerful elephants. The last unit, his Bruttian army, Hannibal held back. He wanted to join her himself and personally command her. He relied on these veterans, planning to save them for use later in the battle when all the other formations would fail. The Romans won't be able to spot them at first - not in that ghostly light of the early morning.
This was Hannibal's only hope.
And so it happened that on the field at Zama there were three different battles instead of one.
When Hannibal set out, the Roman group was already moving towards him, slowly, like a well-oiled single mechanism, with banners and with numerous cavalry marching along the edges. The infantry formation advanced into its usual three ranks: the front rank, the spearmen and the triarii supporting them. But most of the maniples had unusual open passages between them - gaps covered only by nimble javelin throwers.
The armed masses converged in the middle of the field, where Hannibal and Scipio entered into negotiations.
All of a sudden, all the Roman trumpets and horns blared simultaneously. This frightened the elephants ahead of the Carthaginian formation.
And then it became clear the purpose of the strange gaps in the center of the Roman buildings. The elephants, in their madness, rushed towards them, where they were met by a flurry of projectiles. The huge beasts turned back or rushed forward through the ranks. Those that were at the edges sought to turn towards the Carthaginian cavalry. In a matter of minutes, the elephants turned out to be uncontrollable and useless, bringing only confusion. At this moment, Scipio sent forward his horsemen, who occupied the flanks.
The Carthaginian cavalry was too few to take control of the experienced detachments of Lelia and Masinissa. Both Roman flanks surged forward, and soon the Carthaginian cavalry was routed, the horsemen scattered across the field, and the pursuers and the pursued disappeared from sight.
The Ligurians and Gauls had already entered into battle with the main Roman formation, "measuring their strength in single combat," as Hannibal predicted. Mago's men fought so hard that the Roman advance was halted. The triarii rushed into the gaps, disappearing into the moving masses, and the Romans again moved forward. But the Carthaginians of the second wave did not go to the aid of the exhausted Ligurians and Gauls. Hannibal ordered his formations to stay apart. As the survivors of the first wave began to retreat, they were met by the weapons of the Carthaginians pointed at them. Crazed groups of Ligurians and Gauls furiously attacked the Carthaginians, who destroyed them.
The Roman system moved on this second army of Hannibal, his numerous Carthaginians. These recruits from Carthage itself, commanded by old Hanno, were crushed by the retreating men of Mago. The Roman front formation crushed all his javelin throwers. The legionnaires hid behind their shields and lashed out with their swords. Their pressure intensified as spearmen from the second rank entered the fray. The Carthaginians fought desperately, holding back the experienced legions. It was already late in the morning when the Carthaginians retreated, stepping aside. They left the battlefield strewn with the wounded and the dead.
Behind the dead stood Hannibal's last line, the veterans of Italy.
Their dark ranks were intact, waiting. Hannibal kept his great striking force apart during these early hours. The waning Legionnaires came face to face with the veterans who up to this point had triumphed over them.
Scipio could not retreat. Trumpets sounded from end to end of the legions. The legates galloped to the stands with reckless boldness, and the cries of the centurions overrode the groans of the wounded. Orders reached the people in the ranks: to rest, to recover their weapons, to carry away the wounded Romans, to clear the battlefield, not to leave banners. Scipio did not take his eyes off the "Italian" army, which was at a distance of three hundred paces. On both flanks of this army, the fugitives from the earlier battles were gathered to take the places vacated by the Carthaginian cavalry. In this quick regrouping, Scipio sensed Hannibal in action. There was still no sign that the Roman cavalry was returning to the battlefield.
Scipio waited until his legionaries got their second wind and their weapons and got water. Then he gave the order again. The three lines of the legions reorganized: the spearmen, who supported the injured front line, moved to one flank, the triarii to the other. The formation of the Romans lengthened, going beyond the battle formation of Hannibal. After that, he moved forward again.
Scipio valiantly attacked Hannibal's fresh army, throwing an equal force of his weary warriors into it, standing in a long thin line that converged on the enemy's weak flanks. In doing this, he tested the fortitude of his men and the resourcefulness of Lelia and Masinissa.
Thus began the final battle. What might have happened when Hannibal's Bruttians met the legions will never be known, because the Roman cavalry returned. Obeying the orders of Lelia and Masinissa, she approached from the rear of Hannibal's veterans. The Bruttians bravely resisted on the flanks the cross attack of the Roman infantry. Now their back ranks had to turn around to meet the cavalry advancing with a stomp. They fought silently, unbowed. There was no more hope left. There was no Carthaginian cavalry left to deal with the Romans. Scipio triumphed a victory not inferior to Cannes.
Surrounded veterans could not get away from the cavalry. They fought until most of them died.
When the passage was formed, Hannibal and several horsemen sped away. They did not go to the nearly deserted Carthaginian camp. There were no significant formations left to defend them, because Hannibal threw all his forces into the battle in the valley. (Scipio will say later that Hannibal did everything that was humanly possible at the battle of Zama.)
Hannibal rode without stopping east to Hadrumet, which was 90 miles away. Transport ships with provisions and a small garrison were waiting there. By escaping, he thereby saved his city from the humiliation of being captured. He had no illusions about the continuation of the war. In the late hours of the day on which the Battle of Zama took place, he lost the army he had commanded for sixteen years. Trying to defend the city itself without an army could only cause a siege that would end in starvation.
From Hadrumet, Hannibal sent a warning to the people who were within the city: “We lost more than the battle - we lost the war. Agree with the terms that will be offered to you.
As he waited, he heard about the outcome of the last resistance in Africa. Late with their help, the Numidian horsemen from the far west arrived, led by the sons of Syphax. They looked numerous and formidable, but were soon defeated and driven back by the veterans of the Roman army. If they had arrived in time for Hannibal before Zama, the outcome of the battle could have been different. Scipio cold-bloodedly struck immediately after the arrival of Masinissa, before the West Africans arrived. By his devastation of the valley of Bagrada, he forced Hannibal to move towards him in that period of time. And now the long-awaited convoys from Italy were approaching, with new legions and consuls leading them.
The authority of Scipio, however, was not subject to any doubt. He won the final victory as commander-in-chief, and Rome pinned on him alone the hope of ending the war. After a thorough examination of the fortifications of Carthage from the sea, Scipio did not want to besiege the city. And he also never wanted to destroy Carthage.
Hannibal seems to have read Scipio's thoughts. It will forever remain unclear what these two people agreed on in front of Zama. We only know what Scipio himself decided to make public years later. Of course, they both unusually understood each other.
For Hannibal in Hadrumet relied on the word of Scipio. The conditions of Scipio, in any case, will save the city and allow its inhabitants to start a new life, with a new way of life, which will remain Carthaginian.
Along the way, the previous year's terms of peace, proposed by Scipio, underwent slight changes. These changes were made primarily by the Senate. They were as follows:
Surrender all warships, leaving only ten, and all the elephants.
Not to conduct any future military operations in Africa without the consent of the Roman government.
Pay 10,000 talents of silver over fifty years.
Carthage must become a friend and ally of the Roman Republic.
So in the end the city of Carthage was forced to accept terms that the Barcids swore they would never accept, to become a friend of the Romans.
However, at the insistence of Scipio, this great city retained its autonomy. The Carthaginians themselves did not suffer any damage, they retained their government, rural lands and urban areas, which they owned before the war. Thus, according to the conditions of Scipio, there was no interference in the life of the civilian population. There was no demand for the extradition of Hannibal.
The Romans strictly demanded compliance with further terms of surrender: for those ships that were washed ashore near Carthage and plundered, it was necessary to pay in full. And Masinissa was to receive royal power over all the Numidian lands as a reward. As for the deserters, according to Roman law, all surrendered Roman citizens were crucified on crosses, all Italics were killed, according to the chronicles.
Historiographers say that when Publius Cornelius Scipio returned in triumph to Rome the following year (201 BC), he contributed 123,000 pounds of silver to the treasury. Along the way, he was greeted by crowds of people from the farms. However, this triumph of his, it seems, was more popular than official. The masses in the Forum apparently felt that their eccentric commander had failed to truly bring the Carthaginians to their knees after the ordeal of war. The Claudian party in the Senate was jealous of Scipio's unprecedented success. Few of his friends survived. (Of the wartime leaders, only Varro, the forgotten hero of Cannes, survived.) New people resented that he had deceitfully changed the terms of the peace they had proposed. Many feared that the worship of the people might lead them to the royal throne. In the end, the Senate was content to give him the honorary title of princeps senatus (First Citizen) and the title of Africanus (African).
"One thing is certain," as Livy remarked, "he became the first general to bear the name of the nation he conquered."
The future ancient politician and military leader Scipio Africanus was born in Rome in 235 BC. e. He belonged to the Cornelii, a noble and influential family of Etruscan origin. Many of his ancestors became consuls, including Father Publius. Despite the fact that the Scipios (a branch of the Cornelian family) were influential in the political arena, they did not differ in wealth. Another important feature of this family was Hellenization (exposure to Greek culture), when it was not yet widespread.
The beginning of a military career
Scipio Africanus, whose childhood is practically unknown, began to fall into the Roman chronicles after, in 218 BC. e. chose a military career. She determined his entire future. The choice was not random. Just in this year, Rome declared war on its southern neighbor Carthage. This Phoenician state was the republic's main rival in the Mediterranean. Its capital was in northern Africa. At the same time, Carthage had many colonies in Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica and Spain (Iberia). It was to this country that Scipio's father, the consul Publius, was sent. His 17-year-old son went with him. In Spain, the Romans were to face Hannibal.
At the end of 218, Scipio Africanus took part in a major battle for the first time. It was the battle of Ticin. The Romans lost it because they underestimated their enemy. But Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus himself only became famous under Ticinus. Upon learning that his father was attacked by enemy cavalry, the young warrior rushed alone to the aid of the consul. The horsemen fled. After this episode, Cornelius Scipio Africanus was awarded an honorary award for his courage in the form of it. It is significant that the brave young man defiantly refused him, declaring that feats are not done for the sake of recognition.
Further information about the young man is contradictory. So it is not completely established whether he participated in subsequent battles with the Carthaginians of that period. These inaccuracies are due to the fact that the ancient era has left us many sources that directly refute each other. At that time, chroniclers often resorted to falsifications to denigrate their enemies, while others, on the contrary, overestimated the merits of their patrons. One way or another, there is a version that in 216 BC. e. Scipio Africanus was a military tribune in the army that fought at the Battle of Cannae. If this is true, then he was extremely lucky to stay alive and avoid captivity, because the Romans then suffered a crushing defeat from the troops of Hannibal.
Scipio was distinguished by a strong character and bright. An episode is known when, having learned about the desire of several commanders to desert due to the defeats of the republic, he burst into the tent of the conspirators and, threatening them with a sword, forced them to swear allegiance to Rome.
roman avenger
Scipio's father and uncle died during that time. From the family, only his older brother Lucius remained (his mother died in childbirth). In 211 BC. e. Publius put forward his candidacy for the post of curule aedile in order to support a relative in his own political campaign. In the end, both were elected. Scipio the African Senior began his own civilian career, which would later also be marked by numerous successes.
Shortly before being elected aedile, the military man participated in the successful siege of Capua. After the capture of this city, the Roman authorities began to consider a plan for a campaign in Spain. In this country, the Carthaginians had many cities and ports, which were sources of food and other important resources for the victorious army of Hannibal. So far, this strategist has not been defeated, which meant that the Romans needed a new strategy.
It was decided to send an expedition to Spain, which was supposed to deprive Hannibal of his rear. Due to the endless defeats at the people's assembly, none of the generals dared to put forward their candidacy. No one wanted to stand up after another defeat. At this critical moment, Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus offered to lead the army. His father and uncle died the day before. For the military, the campaign against Carthage became personal. He spoke of revenge for the defeat of Rome, after which he was elected proconsul. For a 24-year-old young man, this was an unprecedented success. Now he had to justify the aspirations and hopes of his fellow citizens.
Spanish campaign
In 210 BC. e. Scipio the African senior, together with the 11,000th army, went to Spain by sea. There he joined forces with the local propraetor's army. Now he had 24,000 men in his hands. Compared with the Carthaginian contingent in the Pyrenees, this was a rather modest army. There were three Phoenician armies in Spain. The commanders were Hannibal's brothers Magon and Hasdrubal, as well as the namesake of the latter Hasdrubal Giscon. If at least two of these troops united, then Scipio would have been threatened with inevitable defeat.
However, the commander was able to take advantage of all his minor advantages. His strategy was completely different from that followed by his predecessors, who suffered defeat from the Carthaginians. Firstly, it used cities north of the Iber River, once founded by Greek colonists, as its bases. Scipio Africanus especially insisted on this. The brief biography of the strategist is full of episodes when he made extraordinary decisions. The Iberian campaign was just such a case. Scipio understood that there was no point in landing in the south, where the enemy positions were especially strong.
Secondly, the Roman commander turned for help to the local population, dissatisfied with the rule of the Carthaginian colonizers. These were the Celtiberians and the northern Iberians. The army of the republic acted in concert with the partisans, who knew the area and the roads there very well.
Thirdly, Scipio decided not to give a general battle immediately, but to gradually wear down the enemy. To do this, he resorted to fleeting raids. There were four in total. When the next army of the Carthaginians was defeated, the Romans returned to their bases, there they restored their strength and again went into battle. The commander tried not to move too far from his own positions, so as not to be cut off from the rear. If you add up all these principles of a strategist, then you can understand what Scipio the African Senior became famous for. He knew how to make the most optimal decision and always used own advantages and enemy weakness.
Conquest of Iberia
The first major success of Scipio in Spain was the capture of New Carthage, a major port that was the stronghold of the regional rule of African colonists. In ancient sources, the story of the conquest of the city was supplemented by a story that became known as "the generosity of Scipio Africanus."
Once, 300 Iberian hostages of a noble family were brought to the commander. Also, the Roman soldiers gave Scipio as a gift a young captive, distinguished by rare beauty. From her, the commander learned that the girl was the bride of one of the hostages taken. Then the leader of the Romans ordered her to be given to her fiancé. The prisoner thanked Scipio by bringing his own large detachment of cavalry into his army and since then faithfully served the republic. This story has become widely known thanks to the artists of the Renaissance and modern times. Many European masters (Nicola Poussin, Niccolo del Abbate, etc.) depicted this ancient story in their pictures.
Scipio achieved a decisive victory in Spain at the Battle of Ilipa in 206 BC. e. Commander-in-Chief Hasdrubal Giscon fled to his homeland. After the defeat in Carthage, they decided to abandon the Iberian possessions. Roman power was finally established in Spain.
Homecoming
At the end of 206 BC. e. Scipio Africanus returned triumphantly to Rome. Publius Cornelius spoke to the Senate and announced his victories - he managed to defeat four enemy armies and drive the Carthaginians out of Spain. During the absence of the commander in the capital, in power, he had many envious enemies who did not want the political take-off of the strategist. This first opposition was led by Quintus Fulvius Flaccus. The Senate denied Scipio a formal ritual of triumph. However, this did not prevent the commander from becoming a real folk hero. Ordinary Romans enthusiastically greeted the winner.
However, the war with Carthage was not yet over. Although Punic rule in Spain was a thing of the past, Rome's enemies still controlled North Africa and some of the Mediterranean islands. Scipio went to Sicily. If the Republic succeeded in recapturing this island, it would become an excellent springboard for a further attack on North Africa. Having landed in Sicily, the commander with a small army was able to enlist the support of the local population (mainly Greek colonists), promising him to return all the property lost during the ongoing war.
African campaign
In the summer of 204 BC. e. Scipio, together with an army of about 35 thousand people, left the Sicilian coast and went to Africa. There it was to be decided whether the Roman Republic would become a key power in the ancient Mediterranean. It was those successes of the commander in Africa that made him known as Scipio Africanus. Photos of his busts and sculptures from different parts of the Roman state show that he really became a legendary figure for his compatriots.
The first attempt to take Utica (a large city northeast of Carthage) ended in nothing. Scipio, along with his army, wintered right on the African coast, without owning at least some significant settlement. At this time, the Carthaginians sent a letter to their best commander Hannibal, in which they demanded that he return from Europe to his homeland and defend his country. In order to somehow stretch the time, the Punians began to negotiate peace with Scipio, which, however, ended in nothing.
When Hannibal arrived in Africa, he also arranged for a meeting with the Roman general. The following proposal followed - the Carthaginians leave Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily and Spain in exchange for a peace treaty. However, Publius Cornelius refused to accept such terms. He objected that the republic already actually controlled all these lands. Scipio, for his part, proposed a tougher version of the agreement. Hannibal refused. It became clear that bloodshed was inevitable. The fate of Hannibal and Scipio Africanus was to be decided in a face-to-face confrontation.
Battle of Zama
The decisive Battle of Zama took place on October 19, 202 BC. e. The Numidians, the indigenous inhabitants of the African continent, also came out on the side of the Roman Republic. Their help was invaluable to the Latins. The fact was that the Romans for a long time puzzled over how to neutralize Hannibal's most formidable weapon - elephants. These huge animals terrified the Europeans, who had never dealt with such beasts. Archers and riders sat on elephants, shooting their enemies. Such a "cavalry" had already demonstrated its effectiveness during Hannibal's attack on Italy. He led the elephants through the high Alps, which led the Romans into even more confusion.
The Numidians, on the other hand, were well aware of the habits of elephants. They understood how to neutralize them. It was these animals that the Africans took up, eventually offering the Romans the best strategy (more on that below). As for the numerical ratio, the aspect ratio was about the same. Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus short biography which already consisted of many campaigns, brought to Africa a well-knit and well-coordinated army, which unquestioningly carried out the orders of its long-term commander. The Roman army consisted of 33,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry, while the Carthaginians had 34,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry.
Victory over Hannibal
The army of Publius Cornelius met the attack of the elephants in an organized manner. The infantry made way for the animals. Those at high speed swept through the formed corridors without hitting anyone. In the rear, numerous archers were waiting for them, who fired at the animals with dense fire. The decisive role was played by the Roman cavalry. First, she defeated the Carthaginian cavalry, and then hit the infantrymen in the rear. The ranks of the Punians trembled and they ran. Hannibal tried to stop them. Scipio Africanus, however, got what he wanted. He turned out to be the winner. The Carthaginian army lost 20 thousand killed, and the Roman - 5 thousand.
Hannibal became an outcast and fled far to the east. Carthage admitted defeat. The Roman Republic received all of his European and insular possessions. The sovereignty of the African state was significantly undermined. In addition, Numibia gained independence, which became a faithful ally of Rome. Scipio's victories ensured the dominant position of the republic throughout the Mediterranean. A few decades after his death, the Third Punic War broke out, after which Carthage was finally destroyed and turned into ruins.
War with the Seleucids
The next ten years passed peacefully for the commander. He came to grips with his political career, for which he had not had enough time before because of regular campaigns and expeditions. To understand who Publius Cornelius Scipio the African Senior is, it is enough to list his civil positions and titles. He became consul, censor, senate trailer and legate. The figure of Scipio turned out to be the most significant in the Roman politics of his time. But he also had enemies in the face of the aristocratic opposition.
In 191 BC. e. the commander again went to war. This time he traveled east, where Rome was in conflict with the Seleucid Empire. The decisive battle took place in the winter of 190-189. BC e. (due to conflicting sources, the exact date is unknown). As a result of the Syrian war, King Antiochus paid a huge indemnity to the republic in the amount of 15 thousand talents, and also gave her land in modern western Turkey.
Judgment and death
After returning to his homeland, Scipio faced a serious problem. His opponents in the Senate initiated a lawsuit against him. The commander (together with his brother Lucius) was accused of financial dishonesty, theft of money, etc. Was appointed state commission, which forced the Scipios to pay a large fine.
This was followed by a period of behind-the-scenes struggle with the opponents of Publius Cornelius in the Senate. His main antagonist was Mark Porcius Cato, who wanted to get a censorship position and sought to destroy the faction of supporters of the famous military leader. As a result, Scipio lost all his posts. He went into self-imposed exile on his estate in Campania. There Publius Cornelius spent Last year own life. He died in 183 BC. e. at the age of 52. Coincidentally, his main military opponent Hannibal, who also lived in exile in the east, died at the same time. Scipio turned out to be one of the most prominent people of his time. He managed to defeat Carthage and the Persians, and also made a distinguished career in politics.